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This thesis examines the reasons for the failure of the 
u.s. National Drug Control Strategy, and the Andean 
Initiative. Its scope is limited to cocaine trafficking from 
the Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, to the 
United States. It provides the background of those 
strategies, and analyzes various explanations for failure. 
Based on this analysis, the thesis provides policy 
recommendations for antidrug efforts, which include increased 
emphasis on demand-related issues, judicial system consistency 
and harsher penalties, improvement in domestic and 
international coordination, and expanded restrictions on U.S. 
government agencies conducting covert operations. 
In 
solution 
conclusion, this thesis proposes 
to the drug problem lies not 
that any real 
with supply 
interdiction, and not with expanded foreign assistance, but 
with targeting user accountability in the United States. 
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In 1986 the United States government declared war on 
drugs. In attempting to reduce domestic drug abuse and 
international drug trafficking, the White House in September 
1989 established the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) as a management framework to coordinate national 
antidrug efforts. The National Drug Control Strategy of the 
United States evolved from the ONDCP. 
By 1995, and after spending billions in tax dollars to 
fund antidrug programs, the drug abuse and trafficking problem 
still exist. Efforts to counter drugs have only expanded the 
vast antidrug bureaucracy, creating a nearly static policy. 
Programs targeting drug suppliers overseas have had only 
limited success, while straining relations with source 
countries. 
The factors that have undermined success in antidrug 
efforts can be arranged under the broad categories of 
economics and politics. Economically, the $50 million to $60 
million in restrictive U.S. antidrug assistance to source 
nations in Latin America represents a small sum when compared 
to the $7 billion of illegal drug revenues reinvested in the 
Colombian economy every year, and the $110 billion spent 
annually by U.S. consumers on illegal drugs. Politically, 
inter-agency coordination failure, non-compliance with policy 
concepts, and unrealistic strategy objectives have all 
contributed to the continued failure of antidrug policy. 
xi 
The thesis examines the goals and objectives of the 
National Drug Control Strategy of the United States and the 
Andean Initiative, and then offers several arguments for their 
failures. The thesis contends that U.S. antidrug efforts will 
continue to fail in their present form if not restructured. 
The thesis examines the effects of the drug problem on U.S. 
society, and agrees that policy will only succeed under the 
following conditions: judicial system consistency in handling 
drug cases; improvement in domestic and international 
coordination; and increased and consistent emphasis upon 
demand-related issues. 
The thesis concludes that when U.S. decision-makers 
consider future antidrug policy, they should do so targeting 
demand. If the drug problem genuinely threatens national 
security, then U.S. policy-makers need to institute effective 
drug education, treatment, and testing programs that ensure 
compliance with federal laws. This thesis proposes that any 
real solution to the drug problem lies not with supply 
interdiction, not with expanded foreign assistance, but with 
targeting user accountability in the United States. 
Xil 
I . INTRODUCTION 
The United States has failed to win the drug war. 
Throughout most of the twentieth century the United States has 
made several attempts to establish some form of drug policy. 1 
An inherently flawed U.S. policy approach has been responsible 
for a series of ineffective government antidrug abuse 
measures, which have failed to resolve the problem. 
The current policy emphasis has shifted to focus on supply 
reduction. 2 The emergence, in the 1980s of crack, a cocaine 
derivative, led to an increase in drug abuse and contributed 
significantly to increased criminal violence throughout the 
nation. In response, the Reagan administration declared "war 
on drugs", and moved beyond the previous focus on domestic 
law enforcement, to acknowledging drug trafficking as a 
national security threat. 3 The effects of both cocaine abuse 
and trafficking were not fully acknowledged until the Bush 
Administration (1989-93) ranked the drug war among the top 
three priorities of the National Security Council. 
1James A. Inciardi. Handbook of Drug Control in the United 
States. Greenwood, 1990, 5. 
2Georges Fauriol. Security in the Americas. National Defense 
University Press, 1989, 9. 
3Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, National Security 
Directive 221, Declaration of Drug Trafficking as a National 
Security Threat, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1986. 
1 
Drug war efforts expanded significantly to include U.S. 
military participation. 4 
In his efforts to address the drug problem, President 
Reagan created the Office of National Drug Control Policy, a 
Cabinet level agency, as part of the Executive. Instituted 
under the Bush Administration, the ONDCP developed a 
comprehensive, coordinated plan to address drug related 
activity. 5 The National Drug Control Strategy evolved from 
this effort, as an effort to overcome the drug problem both 
domestically and abroad. 
A more regionalized approach to the surging cocaine 
problem surfaced with the Andean Initiative. On February 15, 
1990 President Bush and the leaders of Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Peru met at the Cartagena Summit to discuss cooperative 
antidrug operations. 6 This strategy was instituted by 
President Bush as a multilateral effort to direct U.S. 
antidrug action in the Andean source countries. 
Two major factors have undermined success in antidrug 
policy. The first is economics, probably the single most 
important factor as to why the drug war still exists. The 
U.S. provides $50 million to $60 million in direct aid 
annually to Colombia for antidrug assistance. That represents 
4 Defense Authorization Act of 1989, Department of Defense 
Assigned as Lead Agency for Detection and Monitoring of Suspected 
Drug Traffickers, U.S. Government Printing Office, September 
1989. 
5Dione M. Canova. The National Drug Control Strategy, A 
Synopsis. Handbook of Drug Control in the United States by James 
Inciardi, Greenwood, 1990, 339. 
6 U.S. Congressional Hearing, Andean Initiative, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 6 & 20 June 1990, 97. 
2 
a small sum, when compared to the $7 billion of illegal drug 
revenues reinvested in the Colombian economy every year, 7 and 
the $110 billion spent annually by U.S. consumers on illegal 
drugs. 8 
The second factor that complicates success in the drug war 
is politics. From the beginning, inter-agency coordination 
failure, non-compliance with policy concepts, and unrealistic 
strategy objectives have continued to plague antidrug efforts. 
For example, the U.S. Congress mandated under the 
establishment of the National Drug Control Strategy that funds 
be equally divided between supply and demand programs. 
Program administrators have consistently ignored this 
requirement every year with minimal interference from 
Congress. Statistics reveal that funding for supply-side 
programs has generally been twice that of the demand-side. 9 
Continuity in policy for both the National Drug Control 
Strategy, and the Andean Initiative have also been complicated 
by administration changes, and the lack of coordination among 
antidrug agencies. 10 
'Rensselaer W. Lee, III, "Economic Aid Could Not Stop Drug 
Production," in David Bender and Bruno Leones, The War On Drugs, 
Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven, 1990), 183. 
8G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International 
Political System, Westview, 1989, 274. 
9National Drug Control Strategy 1994, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., 76. 
10Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine 
and Power in the Andean States and Panama, Praeger, 1989, 128. 
3 
The importance of this thesis is based on the following: 
(1) within the United States drug abuse strains the medical, 
legal, and law enforcement services; ( 2) vast efforts to 
counter this threat have failed; and (3) the international war 
on drugs affects state to state relations. 
This thesis will attempt to explain the failures of the 
U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and Andean Initiative by 
offering several arguments. Concerning economics, arguments 
will include: (1) why the profitability of drug trafficking 
supersedes the efforts made by U.S. policy; ( 2) how money 
laundering networks are practically impenetrable; (3) why 
U.S. foreign financial assistance programs are ineffective; 
and (4) how the corruption potential within the drug trade has 
impacted efforts to counter that trade. 
For political failures, arguments will include: (1) how 
U.S. government covert operations concerning illegal drug 
trafficking have undermined legitimate efforts; (2) why the 
vast U.S. bureaucracy is unable to coordinate antidrug 
agencies; ( 3) how U.S. drug policy itself is really 
unilateral; (4) how the U.S. judiciary lacks consistency in 
drug related cases; (5) why drug cartels are essentially too 
powerful for Latin American governments to subdue; (6) why 
U.S. foreign policy relating to drug trafficking has been 
inconsistent; and (7) how a highly effective and resourceful 
U.S. military has been misused. 
Chapter I will provide a historical overview of the modern 
drug problem. Subsequent chapters will provide a 
comprehensive summary of the U.S. National Drug Control 
Strategy and Andean Initiative including their origins and 
operative framework. 
4 
An analysis of the various sources related to the illegal 
drug problem should provide indications on why the drug war is 
failing. Recommendations and options for future U.S. policy 
will be offered as part of the conclusion. Due to the broad 
scope of this issue, this thesis will only focus on antidrug 
measures covered by the National Drug Control Strategy and 
Andean Initiative as they relate to the United States and the 
Andean nations involved. 
5 
6 
II. STRATEGY OVERVIEW 
The major emphasis of this thesis will be the U.S. 
National Drug Control Strategy. It is essential to provide 
the reader with its roots, framework, and implementation in 
order to substantiate the arguments. This chapter will 
attempt to provide a comprehensive outline of the major 
strategy concepts and how they have shaped U.S. policy. 
A. POLICY ROOTS 
The U.S. drug policy has a lengthy history dating back to 
the early 1900s. The history of "modern" drug control, 
however, can be traced to the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment 
Act of 1972. 11 Initially, it was developed to address the 
alarming heroin problem in the United States. It sought to 
formally balance Federal antidrug policy measures by enhancing 
prevention and treatment programs. 12 Its focus was to 
establish several antidrug agencies to plan, coordinate, and 
implement effective policy. 
Despite increased antidrug measures, domestic drug abuse 
continued to surge through the 1970s and into the next decade. 
Widespread use of crack-cocaine in the 1980s contributed to 
changing the public's perception of the drug problem. Once 
considered only an inner-city problem, the true extent of 
11 James A. Inciardi, Handbook of Drug Control in the United 
States, Greenwood, 1990, 97. 
12Senate Committee on Armed Services Testimony, Federal Drug 
Abuse Control Policy and The Role of The Military in Anti-Drug 
Efforts, U.S. General Accounting Office, 8 June 1988, 2. 
7 
cocaine abuse became apparent with the deaths of two well 
known sports figures, Len Bias13 and Don Rogers14 , attributed 
to cocaine overdose. 15 Increased media coverage forced 
congressional debate on the issue of drug abuse resulting in 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 
The Act formally recognized that antidrug policies 
required more than arrests and seizures. Nearly $4 billion in 
policy funding provided to expand drug abuse programs, 
including increased education, prevention, and treatment 
programs. The Act also created the Office of Substance Abuse 
Prevention (OSAP), tasked with improving technology transfers, 
managing demonstration program grants, working with community 
based programs, and coordinating federal, state, and local 
drug abuse programs. 
Continued lack of progress in the drug war instigated 
further legislation, expanding antidrug measures with the 
Anti-Drug Act of 1988. This provided a "management 
framework" 16 for the newly created Office of National Drug 
Control Policy 
Executive. The 
(ONDCP), a Cabinet level agency within the 
ONDCP was charged with developing and 
coordinating Federal antidrug efforts, along with assisting 
13
"Len Bias, Top College Basketball Star, Dies After Cocaine 
Use," Los Angeles Herald, 2 July 1986. 
14
"Don Rogers, Cleveland Browns Defensive Back, Dies Due to 
Cocaine Poisoning," The Sacramento Bee, 1 July 1986. 
15Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine 
and Power in the Andean States and Panama, Praeger, 1989, 121. 
16Drug Control: The Reauthorization of The Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, U.S. General Accounting Office, 
GAO/T-GGD-94-7, 5 October 1993, 1. 
8 
Congress in overseeing these efforts. 17 The ONDCP, under 
the direction of William J. Bennett, its first drug "czar", 18 
developed and implemented guidelines for the domestic and 
international strategy. 
According to Congress, required funding of supply and 
demand programs was to be equally distributed. However, 
statistics reveal that from Fiscal Year 1988 to FY1995, at no 
time was there an equitable distribution of funding. In fact, 
supply-related funding throughout the entire period of the 
National Drug Control Strategy has consistently "outstripped" 
that of demand related programs as Figure 2-1 indicates. 19 
17Drug Control, The Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
Strategies Need Performance Measures, U.S. General Accounting 
Office, GAO/T-GGD-94-49, 15 November 1993, 1. 
18Scott B. MacDonald, Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin 
American Drug Trade, Praeger, 1988, 148. 
19National Drug Control Strategy 1994, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, £xecutive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., 76. 
9 
Federal Drug Control Spending 
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B. NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 
In September of 1989, the Bush Administration published 
the first National Drug Control Strategy, thus instituting a 
comprehensive policy that included measures addressing drug 
abuse and trafficking. The main goal of the strategy was to 
disrupt, dismantle, and destroy the illegal drug market 
affecting the United States. 20 In order to achleve this goal, 
four major areas were addressed. They were (1) drug abuse 
education programs; (2) drug abuse treatment programs; (3) the 
dismantling of international drug cartels; and (4) the 
disruption of drug trafficking networks. 
Other related factors included restructuring the criminal 
justice systems both domestically and abroad, drug abuse 
related research, and upgrading intelligence cooperation. The 
following is an overview of the major strategy concerns. 
1. Education 
Strategy planners and critics alike consider education the 
key element in reducing present and future drug abuse. Recent 
evidence provided by the National Parents' Resource 
Institution for Drug Education (PRIDE) revealed drug abuse 
among high school students for 1993-1994 to be on the rise. 
wNational Drug Control Strategy 1989, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., September 1989, 47. 
·n 
_______________________________________________ ___. 
According to one source, a more relaxed attitude by some is 
partly to blame for the problem. 21 With this in mind, the 
current strategy places the emphasis on the nation's youth. 
The importance of deterring those not yet using drugs is 
deemed crucial. Targeting the nation's educational system, 
the U.S. Department of Education is working with various state 
and local antidrug agencies on drug deterrence programs. 
Antidrug policy instituted by school administrators 
throughout the nation varies widely, and reflects conflicting 
attitudes toward the drug problem. Many conservatives argue 
that U.S. society is being devastated by drugs, and thus tend 
to promote hard-line measures emphasizing harsh punishment 
and user accountability. The nation's first drug czar William 
J. Bennett stated that "Constitutional liberties are in 
jeopardy from drugs themselves, which every day scorch the 
earth of our common freedom. " 22 
When drug problems within the school system escalate, 
Federal administrators encourage schools to delicately balance 
antidrug education programs with measures to protect those 
children who are threatened by the presence of drugs. Schools 
qualifying for Federal grants are encouraged to use funds for 
21 Lee Brown, Director, Office of National Drug Control 
Policy, "Survey: Teen-Age Drug Use Rising," Monterey Herald, 
21 October 1994. 
22William J. Bennett, "Introduction," in David Bender 
and Bruno Leones, eds., War on Drugs, Opposing Viewpoints, 
(Greenhaven, 1990), 13. 
12 
obtaining security equipment to ensure a safe, drug-free 
learning environment. 23 
In contrast, civil libertarians believe that government 
officials have exaggerated the danger of illegal drugs in 
order to rationalize an attack on individuals' Constitutional 
rights. Their logic is based on the belief that the rights of 
individuals are more important than general safety and 
stability. For example, Havery Gittler, Executive Director of 
the Ohio Branch, American Civil Liberties Union states "the 
real victim in the war on drugs is going to be the 
Constitutional rights of the majority." 24 
The National Drug Control Strategy recognizes that schools 
alone cannot fight drugs. Indeed they cannot substitute 
the family, 25 so the strategy also promotes the awareness of 
people within the community on the dangers of drug abuse. To 
succeed, the strategy seeks to link schools with parents, 
businesses, churches, synagogues, law enforcement, civic 
groups, and others within the community. 26 
23National Drug Control Strategy 1992, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., 7. 
MHavery Gittler, "Introduction," in David Bender and Bruno 
Leones, eds., War on Drugs, Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven, 
1990) 1 13 • 
~National Drug Control Strategy 1990, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February 1990, 40. 
2~ational Drug Control Strategy 1991, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., January 1991, 65. 
13 
Community-based programs are encouraged to give children 
an alternative to drugs. The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) coordinates efforts with several 
participating agencies both on state and local levels to 
develop and fund community-based programs. Business 
coalitions, community watch teams, and local government task 
forces seek to target drug user accountability. 
The final educational target of the strategy is the work 
place. Statistics reveal that the majority of illegal drug 
users in the United States are employed. 27 Drug abuse in the 
work place has been shown to (1) contribute to the downturn of 
business productivity; (2) raise injury rates; (3) increase 
medical costs (approximately $100 billion annually) ; 28 
(4) promote illegal activities within the work place; and (5) 
create unsafe working conditions for the employee. 
2. Treatment 
By the time the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy was 
implemented in 1989, there were already over 5000 drug 
treatment programs in operation. Treatment programs 
ultimately seek to reduce social costs associated with drug 
dependency and related problems. Drug treatment programs are 
either privately or publically funded. The National Drug 
nNational Drug Control Strategy 1989, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., September 1989, 56. 
28 The Senate Task Force for a Drug Free America, "The War on 
Drugs is Necessary," in David Bender and Bruno Leones, eds., War 
on Drugs, Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven, 1990), 19. 
14 
Control Strategy has categorized treatment into five levels: 
( 1) detoxification; (2) chemical dependency units; ( 3) 
outpatient clinics; (4) methadone treatment centers; and (5) 
residential therapeutic programs. 29 Cocaine and crack are 
considered the leading illegal drug abuse problems in the 
nation. However the treatment of cocaine addiction has been 
less successful than the treatment of other established 
programs. 
The origins of drug users are wide-spread, and not all 
from inner-city, poverty-stricken locations. Rural areas are 
nearly as heavily impacted by drugs as big cities are. Users 
include college students, doctors, lawyers, professionals, and 
even law enforcement personnel. 
One of the problems facing the treatment for drug abuse 
is the lack of sufficient centers to meet the demand. 
Estimates currently indicate that there are approximately 2.5 
million hard-core drug users in need of treatment, with only 
1.4 million available openings in publically funded treatment 
centers. 30 The fact that private centers are often only 80 
percent filled to capacity is irrelevant to most drug users 
due to high costs and inconvenient locations. 
The Federal government provides funding for treatment 
centers through the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Resources (HHS) for nationally-assisted drug abuse programs. 
Funds for drug related treatment are provided to the Alcohol, 
29National Drug Control Strategy 1989, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., September 1989, 35. 
~National Drug Control Strategy 1994, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February 1994, 37. 
15 
Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) for 
program management. 
The administration of assistance is performed in two 
possible ways. The first is categorized as block grants, 
broad-based assistance programs with less restrictive measures 
on program management. The second consists of categorical 
grants much more focused in their management and distribution. 
The strategy also targets the development of new and 
additional treatment centers. New treatment centers, however, 
are not usually welcomed by communities who fear an increase 
in crime due to these centers. The fact that most surveys 
indicate drug treatment centers do not always increase 
criminal activity is disregarded in favor of the prevailing 
perception among community members. 
Just as community resistance creates tension, the fact 
that many treatment centers are outdated and restricted on the 
type of treatment available is also important. In attempting 
to reduce levels of conflict, one recent government study 
discussed the prospects of locating drug treatment centers on 
under-utilized or closed military bases. 
The ultimate problem undermining success may lie with the 
majority of drug users having a choice to seek treatment. 
Even within the U.S. Federal and State prison systems, those 
incarcerated with past problems of drug use in most cases are 
not required to attend drug treatment. An estimated 50 
percent of Federal prison inmates, and nearly 80 percent of 
State prison inmates have experienced some type of drug use, 
and most convicts complete their terms without receiving any 
treatment. 31 
31National Drug Control Strategy 1990, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February 1990, 35. 
16 
3. Drug Organizations 
The most influential players impacting supply reduction 
efforts in the war on drugs are the drug cartels. These 
organizations tend to be highly centralized with all located 
outside the United States. 
The leading cartel, controlling cocaine distribution 
throughout the world, is currently a Colombian cartel based in 
Cali. Its rival, the Medellin cartel, in the 1980s32 controlled 
approximately 80 percent of all cocaine distribution to the 
United States before being virtually dismantled in 1993. 
The Cali cartel under the leadership of brothers Gilberto 
and Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, Jose Santacruz Londono, and 
Jorge Orej uela Caballero33 now control the flow of cocaine 
worldwide. While the cartel is the centerpoint of cocaine 
trafficking, groups from other nations including the Dominican 
Republic and Jamaica have also become leading "distributors" 
on the east coast of the United States. 34 
The success of cartels can be traced to their power, 
prestige, and influence. Their influence exerted through 
violence and corruption has contributed to destabilizing the 
32Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche, Cocaine 
and Power in the Andean States and Panama, Praeger, 1989, 23. 
33Peter Arnet and Brian Barger, The Kingdom of Cocaine, CNN, 
25 September 1994. 
~Edward Conlon, "The Pols, the Police, and the Gerry Curls: 
Inside one of New York's most notorious Dominican drug gangs," 
The American Spectator, November 1994, 42. 
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Andean nations. 35 For example, before the collapse of the 
Medellin cartel, the use of widespread violence throughout 
Colombia had resulted in the assassination by drug traffickers 
of 50 judge magistrates, 12 journalists, and over 2000 
military and police personnel. 36 
In addition to violence, the Cali cartel employs a more 
subtle approach, corruption. Bribes are widespread, and 
include government, military, and police officials in both 
Latin America and the United States. 37 For example, in 1985 
a major corruption scandal rocked the Miami Police Department. 
As a result, its 800 member force underwent drug testing to 
ensure compliance with federal narcotics laws. In the same 
year, the Colombian government discovered that at least 400 
of its judges had been influenced by some type of drug related 
corruption. 38 
The National Drug Control Strategy seeks to limit drug 
trafficking by dismantling the major drug cartels. The 
strategy has categorized the cartel, or organization into 
three levels. First is the core organization, or drug cartel. 
This refers to a small, highly centralized group of 
individuals retaining nearly all major decision-making 
35Andres Benavente Urbina, Drug Traffic and State 
Stability, North-South, The Magazine of the America's, 
August-September 1992, 34. 
36James M. Malloy, Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary 
Record, Holmes & Meier, 1990. 
n»Magazine Links Politicians to Cali Cartel," 
FBIS-LAT-94-154, 9 August 1994. 
38James A. Inciardi, The War on Drugs, Heroin, Cocaine, 
Crime, and Public Policy. Mayfield, 1986, 194. 
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authority. The cartel's primary responsibility is the 
production and exporting of illegal narcotics. 
The strategy defines the second level in the organization 
as drug trafficking networks. Their function includes 
transportation and distribution of illegal drugs, and the 
coordination of money laundering operations. These networks 
are considered the most crucial link to completing illegal 
drug transactions. 
The final level in the organization are the domestic 
street dealers. Their responsibility lies with the sale of 
illegal drugs to the consumer. The strategy targets the 
three levels emphasizing law enforcement activity, prosecution 
and punishment, and extradition of drug traffickers where 
such treaties exist. 39 
Success in defeating drug cartels lies heavily with the 
level of cooperation between U.S. drug agencies and drug 
source nations. In assisting the Andean nations, the United 
States first attempted to strengthen their laws, legal 
institutions, and antidrug programs. Efforts were also made 
to increase the effectiveness of their law enforcement and 
security activities, thus enabling these nations to take 
effective action against drug trafficking organizations. 40 
While cartels centralize their leadership, strategy 
efforts have been aimed at disrupting their activities through 
the destruction of drug labs, implementation of crop 
39
"Reputed Top Colombian Drug Trafficker Extradited to U.S.," 
The Washington Post, 9 February 1987. 
40National Drug Control Strategy 1992, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., January 1992, 80. 
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eradication and substitution programs, and increasing law 
enforcement measures. These efforts, however, have not 
achieved much success in significantly reducing the production 
of drugs. 
An example of this was provided by the death of Pablo 
Escobar, the former kingpin of the Medellin Cartel. In 
December of 1993, a cooperative effort by Colombian Forces, 
U.S. drug and intelligence agencies, and a right wing 
Colombian group, the "Pepes", successfully located and killed 
Escobar after a fifteen month manhunt. 41 
Secondary level organizations, or drug trafficking 
networks are highly diversified, and much more difficult to 
track. The strategy seeks to identify these networks through 
intense law enforcement action, and international programs 
including: ( 1) interdiction; (2) monitoring exports of 
precursor chemicals; (3) limiting money laundering operations; 
and (4) targeting drug shipment routes. 
The U.S. has successfully disrupted drug trafficking 
routes on several occasions, but the broad effect on the drug 
war has been negligible. The book Inside the Cartel reveals 
how the Medellin cartel's trafficking network collapsed. 
Despite this, the existence of cocaine trafficking was only 
absorbed by its rival competitor, the Cali cartel. 42 
41 S. Gutkin, "Colombian Forces Kill Drug Lord Escobar," 
Monterey Herald, 3 December 1993. 
4~ax Mermelman, Inside The Cartel, SPI, 1994, 272. 
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4. Drug Trafficking Networks 
Disruption of illegal drug trafficking networks is 
considered the most difficult task in supply-side efforts of 
the drug war. In 1988, 355 million people entered or 
reentered the United States, along with more than 100 million 
vehicles, 220 thousand vessels, 635 thousand aircraft, and 
eight million cargo containers. 43 
Expanded efforts of U.S. agencies involved in antidrug 
operations have not successfully stopped the flow of drugs. 
It has, however, forced drug traffickers to develop new 
techniques in smuggling drugs. Using "ingenious" methods, 
traffickers have discovered ways to use chemical processing in 
order to transform cocaine into a vast number of goods such as 
floor tiles, auto gaskets, childrens car seats, and even 
cement poles used for residential street lighting. 44 
Cocaine still continues to be transported by air, 45 sea, 
and across land into the United States, but in newer, and more 
innovative ways. 46 The strategy emphasis in disrupting drug 
trafficking networks is through interdiction. The concept 
seeks to deter drug smuggling by denying the use of air, land, 
43National Drug Control Strategy 1989, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., September 1989, 73. 
44Robert Reinhold, "Ingenious Ways Found For Smuggling 
Drugs," New York Times, 14 April 1994. 
45
"Feds Crack Air Cargo Service for Drugs," Monterey Herald, 
1 July 1994. 
46




and maritime routes. Interdiction however, is just one 
strategy concept, and should be considered only as 
complementary to the broad scope of antidrug efforts. 
The strategy also emphasizes individual accountability by 
threatening harsh punishment to those who traffick drugs. 47 
Network personnel are the most critical in the drug 
trafficking operation, and should be the primary focus for 
supply-side efforts. 
The difficulties of interdiction operations are immense. 
Air interdiction of drug trafficking focuses on detection and 
monitoring of suspect aircraft, and the apprehension of crew 
members by law enforcement personnel. This entire sequence of 
events, however, must include all procedural steps to succeed. 
Interdiction failure has been attributed to the lack of 
resources and cooperation among U.S. drug agencies. 
Statistics on interdiction are marginal at best. Data 
generally account for only "actual'' seizures and arrests, not 
the vast efforts employed that may have deterred trafficking. 
The only success in interdiction has been to shift 
traffickers' techniques in smuggling, not reducing the flow of 
drugs entering the U.S. As depicted in Figure 2-2, 48 drug 
seizures reveal a fluctuating trend based on location. This 
indicates that traffickers alternate shipment routes to 
minimize detection, but do not reduce the flow of their drugs. 
seizures reveal a fluctuating trend based on location. This 
47
"U. s. Informant Convicted of Drug Smuggling Gets Life," 
Miami Herald, 22 April 1994. 
48National Drug Control Strategy 1991, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February 1991, 96. 
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indicates that traffickers alternate shipment routes to 
minimize detection, but do not reduce the flow of their drugs. 
An example of this is revealed in the book Inside The 
Cartel. It describes how the Medellin cartel alone transported 
over 800 kilos of cocaine per week into Florida and California 
during the 1980s. The book also emphasizes that this cocaine 
did not include smuggled cocaine from other trafficking 
organizations, so one can envision the huge amount of drugs 
entering the United States during that period. 
The difficulties in interdiction only grow with marit_me 
efforts. Aircraft smuggling drugs may behave suspiciou. ly 
(i.~. low altitude profile, night flight without lighting, no 
filed flight plan, and operating without a requi ~d 
transponder). However, the interdiction of surface vessel~ s 
muc , more difficult. The use of extensive intelligence c a 
ba~2s provides historical profiles of suspect vessels, t 
thi can be unreliable. The U.S. Navy is primarily responsi e 
fo: maritime interdiction. One problem that plagues tl:. e 
eff rts is the lack of dedicated resources, 49 in that the C 
Nav will conduct maritime interdiction if a surface vessel s 
but the U.S. Navy does tr2 siting the operation area, 
spE: ifically assign a unit to an area. The other obvi 
pro Jlem when conducting maritime interdiction is 
are of required coverage. 
the v 
Land operations are the last avenue of interdicti 
3 
The] employ measures to track illegal drugs entering :: 
United States through border crossings and ports of entry. 
49RADM George N. Gee, USN, Commander, Joint Task Force 
Four, "Vigilance in Paradise," Naval Institute Proceedings, 
October 1992, 87. 
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The leading technique in smuggling that traffickers currently 
employ is the use of cargo-container ships. There are simply 
far too many containers for U.S. Customs officers to inspect. 
Efforts to improve land interdiction efforts used by the 
U.S. include: (1) expanding the use of sophisticated 
intelligence data bases; (2) improving cooperation between 
government officials and private sector business; (3) 
encouraging improved multi-agency cooperation; (4) increasing 
funding and technology for drug detection resources; ( 5) 
improving border control; and (6) expanding the role of the 
U.S. Border Patrol and Department of Defense. 
C. ANDEAN INITIATIVE 
The problem of drug trafficking in Latin America 
represents not only a social threat, but a complex threat to 
state stability. 50 In the fight against illegal drug 
trafficking, the Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Peru are the primary source for cocaine entering the United 
States. The heads of state for the Andean nations cannot 
focus only on those people or groups directly involved in 
clandestine operations. They must also consider the vast 
social network that stretches from the producer, to the 
trader, and to the consumer. Indeed, the local economies 
often benefit from coca or cocaine traffic. 
50Andres Benavente Urbina, "Drug Traffic and State 
Stability," North-South, The Magazine of the Americas, 
August-September 1992, 34. 
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The National Drug Control Strategy has identified cocaine 
as the greatest illegal drug threat to the United States. 51 
The primary methods the strategy identifies for smuggling 
cocaine include: ( 1) the use of air, land, and sea 
transportation that cross the Caribbean and Atlantic oceans; 
and (2) the use of transshipment points throughout virtually 
all Central and South American nations that provide easier 
access to entry points along the U.S. border. 52 
The National Drug Control Strategy has identifies three 
primary components to its cocaine supply reduction strategy: 
( 1) domestic law enforcement; (2) land, air and sea 
interdiction; and (3) international programs designed to 
disrupt, and dismantle drug trafficking operations. These are 
the precursors to the Andean Strategy or Andean Drug 
Initiative. 
The Andean Initiative was developed as a multi-faceted 
approach to enhance cooperative efforts in the complex problem 
of cocaine production and trafficking in Latin America. To 
institute this policy, President Bush and the leaders of 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru met at the Cartagena Summit on 
February 15, 1990 to discuss policy implementation. A follow-
up conference in San Antonio, Texas in 1992 increased 
participating members to include Ecuador, 
Venezuela. 
Mexico, and 
51National Drug Control Strategy 1994, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February 1994, 51. 
~Eighty Percent of Drug Traffic Reportedly Passes Through 
Zulia and Tachira Venezuela, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
JPRS-TDD-94-014-L, 25 March 1994. 
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The Andean Initiative, which was first instituted in June 
1990, provides an international framework for U.S. efforts in 
the drug war targeting the cocaine source countries of 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. President Bush emphasized the 
need to build on a regional consensus and the capability to 
support sustained cooperative action against the common threat 
of drug abuse and drug trafficking. 
The Initiative, which guides U.S. counter drug efforts 
in Latin America, has four principal objectives. They 
include: (1) strengthening the political will and 
institutional capability of the three Andean governments 
(Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru), enabling them to confront the 
Andean cocaine trade; (2) increasing the effectiveness of 
intelligence, military, and law enforcement activities against 
the cocaine trade; (3) inflicting significant damage on the 
trafficking organizations that operate within the three source 
countries by working with host governments to dismantle 
operations and elements of greatest value to the trafficking 
organizations; and (4) strengthening and diversifying the 
legitimate economies of the Andean nations in an attempt to 
overcome the destabilizing effects felt by the cocaine 
problem. 53 Enhancing the basic goals, the U.S. has also 
assisted the Latin nations involved with improving trade, and 
provided technical assistance for financial matters on a 
global spectrum. 
53 Congressional Hearing, Andean Initiative, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 6 & 20 June 1990, 98. 
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III. STRATEGY FAILURE ARGUMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ECONOMIC RELATED FAILURES 
The following section will examine the primary reasons for 
the failure of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and the 
Andean Initiative. The reasons are grouped under two major 
categories-economic and political. It is understood, however, 
that these are overlapping explanations that need to be viewed 
in their totality. Each reason is followed by a summary and 
recommendations. 
The profitability of cocaine can easily overwhelm any 
effort made by the United States to assist drug-producing 
countries in fighting drug trafficking. The cocaine trade 
generates billions of dollars in profits every year, often 
overpowering efforts to conduct legitimate economic 
activities. 54 That trade also threatens regional stability. 
The Latin American nations involved in drug trafficking simply 
lack much of the financial power and resources that drug 
traffickers possess. Drug organizations are well organized, 
and often as competitive as the world's leading multinational 
corporations. "The retail value of drugs now exceeds 
international trade in oil and is only second to the arms 
trade. " 55 
~Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Economic Aid Could Not Stop Drug 
Production," in David Bender & Bruno Leones, eds., War on Drugs, 
Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven, 1990), 182. 
~"United Nations Development Report 1994," Peter Arnet and 
Brian Barger, Kingdom of Cocaine, CNN, 25 September 1994. 
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The Cali drug cartel in Colombia, for example, uses the 
latest techniques and training in corporate mdnagement, and 
financial networking to achieve its average yearly profits of 
$2 billion. Employing a compartmentalized approach to 
managing operations minimizes risk of detection by 
authorities. This enables the cartel to achieve its 
exceptional level of success year after year. 
1. Drug Profitability 
The argument presented by critics of the current U.S. drug 
war strategy focuses on the following: (1) the importance of 
illegal drug revenues as an integral part of the source 
nation's foreign exchange; (2) the vast employment 
opportunities the drug trade provides; and (3) the lack of 
support for the drug war by most Latin Americans. 
Drug organizations are so financially powerful that in 
1988, the Medellin cartel offered to pay off Colombia's 
external debt of $10 billion in return for cancelling the 
nations extradition treaty with the United States. 56 
Economic growth has been rather dramatic in the last few 
years. Some Latin American nations have not only accepted 
illegal drug revenues as part of their economy, but have 
essentially become dependent upon it. 57 No one source agrees 
on the vast amount of money spent every year by U.S. consumers 
on illegal drugs. During the 1980s, figures from one source 
56G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International 
Political System, Westview, 1989, 274. 
57 Donald J. Mabry, "Andean Drug Trafficking and the Military 
Option," Military Review, March 1990, 34. 
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range from $50 billion to $100 billion. 58 Still other sources 
place the cost of consumption at higher levels, ranging from 
$110 billion59 to $150 billion60 a year. When estimating the 
broad (global) value of the drug trade however, figures vary 
widely, from $100 billion to $500 billion per year. 61 No 
matter which estimate of the drug trade's yearly sales is 
correct, the fact remains that the drug cartels annual 
investment in their own economies have risen dramatically in 
the last decade. 
Statistics for 1979 reveal that an estimated $3 billion 
in narco-dollars were reinvested in the Colombian economy. 62 
By 1989, that figure had risen to $5 billion, 63 and estimates 
for 1994 are reported in excess of $7 billion. 64 When 
contrasting these figures with the approximate $50 million to 
$60 million per year in U.S. assistance directly for antidrug 
5~ichael Massing, "Economic Aid Could Stop Drug Production," 
in David Bender and Bruno Leones, eds., The War on Drugs, 
Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven, 1990), 175. 
59G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International 
Political System, Westview, 1989, 274. 
60Donald J. Mabry, The Latin American Narcotics Trade and 
U.S. National Security, Greenwood, 1989, 44. 
61Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche, Cocaine 
and Power in the Andean States and Panama, Pragaer, 1989, 137. 
62 James A. Inciardi, The War on Drugs, Heroin, Cocaine, 
Crime, and Public Policy, Mayfield, 1986. 
~Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Economic Aid Could Not Stop Drug 
Production," in David Bender and Bruno Leones, eds., The War on 
Drugs, Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven, 1990), 182. 
64Peter Arnet and Brian Barger, The Kingdom of Cocaine, CNN, 
25 September 1994. 
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efforts, the imbalance between the drug trade revenues and 
efforts, U.S. assistance becomes obvious. 
Cocaine production is highly profitable in part because of 
its illegal nature, its a~ility to move production facilities 
easily, and its low level of sophistication. Production of 
cocaine follows a simple, vertical processing system, 
comprised of four phases: (1) the harvesting of coca, and its 
transportation to the market place; (2) the transformation of 
coca leaf to coca paste through chemical processing; (3) the 
refinement of coca paste into the "uncut" version of a powder 
cocaine; and (4) the mixture of chemical additives to the pure 
cocaine for expansion. Figure 3-1 reveals the growth rate in 
cocaine profits over its processing cycle. 65 It reveals the 
most extensive growth potential between the wholesale phase of 
cocaine, and retail sales after the cocaine is mixed with 
chemical additives to, in some cases expand its weight ten 
times. 
The impact of the drug trade in Latin America has 
contributed to widespread criminal activity, including 
corruption and murder, and certainly has influenced the life 
of most Colombians. Drug cartels have consistently used to 
their advantage weak national governments, strained judicial 
systems, and the lack of support by most Latin American's to 
exploit their cause. The broad economic impact on Latin 
American economies is highly controversial. 
6~ichael Kennedy, A Simple Economic Model of Cocaine 
Production, Rand/RP-191, 1991. 
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While legitimate growth 
suffered, a parallel 
and foreign trade has certainly 
economy emerged, subsidizing the 
legitimate economy quite successfully. 
Drug revenues reinvested in Latin economies have had 
several positive effects. In Colombia, nation-wide 
construction, for example, showed a relatively higher growth 
rate than the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as a 
direct result of drug money. The rise in construction, private 
business, shopping centers, and hotels have been relatively 
steady. Figure 3-2 compares national growth in construction 
with Colombia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the 
primary drug war period. 66 
66James W. Wilkie, Statistical Abstract of Latin America 
1993, Vol 30 (The Regents of the University of California, 
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While construction growth prospered in the 1980s, 
legitimate agriculture became highly unstable. In 1978 for 
example, Colombia's agricultural sector produced no coca, 67 
with the primary suppliers of coca to the drug trade being 
Bolivia and Peru. By 1983, Colombia had not only established 
itself as a producer and distributor of cocaine throughout the 
world, but also a cultivator of coca as well, utilizing 
between 25,000 hectares and 30,000 hectares. Data for 
agricultural growth trends in the Andean nations considered 
source countries indicate that drug cartels all maintain a 
strong agricultural base with the cultivation of coca. Figure 
3-3 provides the historical trends of legitimate agricultur 
and conveys that the drug trade has contributed to wide-spr, j 
instability. 68 It does not, however, reveal comparative d ~ 
rElating to illicit agricultural growth f~Jm the drug tra, 
67Michael Massing, "Economic Aid Could Stop Drug Production," 
in David Bender and Bruno Leones, eds., The War on Drugs, 
Opposing Viewpoints (Greenwood, 1990), 177. 
68 James W. Wilkie, Statistical Abstract of Latin America 
1993, Volume 30 (The Regents of the University of California, 
1993)' 1250. 
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As the drug trade has subsidized national growth in some 
sectors, it has also created a parallel source of nation-wide 
employment. Jobs in the drug trade traditionally pay higher 
salaries than most legitimate jobs. As an example, a peasant 
cultivating legitimate crops may earn $2 to $3 per day, and 
only if the products make it to market. 
often pay $10 or more per day. 
Dn~g traffickers 
Employment in Colombia has benefitted from its integration 
into the drug trade. For example, in 198 7, drug pro:"'i ts 
directly invested in Medellin's economy, created 28,000 new 
jobs. 69 Estimates for employment in the drug trade vary as 
much as the net value of the drug trade itself. During he 
1:nos, sources estimated that 30,00070 to 150,00071 Coloml: ::1s 
v re actively employed in illegal drug cultivation ~d 
f ·oduction. Estimates for the 1990s in~icate that 500,0C to 
million indi victuals in Colombia earn a living dire ly 
nked to the drug trade. Statistics indicating high le ls 
c unemployment (Figure 3-4) only account fo~.- "legitirr e" 
E Jloyment, not those employed in the drug trade. 72 
;
9Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Cocaine Dilemma in South 
Amerlca," in Donald Mabrys, eds., The Latin American Narcot s 
Trade and U.S. National Security (Greenwood, 1990), 61. 
70Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, Colombia, A 
Country Study, Library of Congress Cataloging, l990, 128. 
71Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White A7alanche, Cocaine 
and Power in the Andean States and Panama, Praeger, 1989, 53. 
72 James W. Wilkie, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 
1993, Vol 30 (The Regents of the University of California, 
1993), 1250. 
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To claim, that all economic aid by the United States has no 
effect on the drug war in Latin America would be an 
overstatement. However, based on the facts presented, the 
likelihood for success of U.S. economic assistance to drug 
producing countries is questionable. Future success in the 
drug war effort may depend on a more flexible U.S. policy that 
addresses consumption in addition to supply, and which is more 
cognizant of the problems confronting drug producing 
countries. 
Simularity of interest is essential for bilateral 
operations. If U.S. interests differ significantly from those 
of participating source nations, then policy should be 
ad-usted to reflect those changing interests. Past his :y 
ha enabled critics to agree that coercive measures in po cy 
ire ~ementation have not always worked. Latin American nati s, 
o:u ~ cornered into submission by the threat of commun_ 'Il, 
i:u 2rgency, and drug problems, now have more leverage 1 en 
co =idering cooperation. The United States needs to const :t 
a licy that is consistent with these regional changes. 
In conclusion to this section, the disproportiona ly 
lc. e amount of money in'Tested in Latin American econo: =s 
ev y year by drug cartels has easily outweighed the mill 1s 
of iollars directed at combatting drug trafficking. _s 
su Jests that the U.S. effort should be redirected at he 
deL~nd side of the equation, focusing instead on the illc 11 
consumption of an estimated 165,000 pounds of cocaine by 
millions of Americans every year. Drug profitability, as many 
critics argue, is not approachable, when considering any type 
of effective antidrug policy. The United States cannot compete 
with drug traffickers that invest over $7 billion annually in 
their respective economies. The only successful policy 
40 
recommendation for targeting and overcoming drug profitability 
is to take the profitability out of drugs, that derives from 
their demand. Focusing on demand-related education, treatment, 
and enforcing antidrug laws, is the only means to achieve 
success. 
2. Money Laundering 
The profits of cocaine trafficking have overwhelmed U.S. 
efforts in the drug war. The financial i:r;:tpact of money 
laundering through government institutions; real estate 
ventures, banking, and private businesses has been severe on 
the economies of the world. In failing to achieve long term 
results, the drug war has forced U.S. policy-makers to 
consider alternate measures in targeting illegal drug 
trafficking. Alternative efforts to destroy drug trafficking 
operations have also focused on the disruption of the cash 
flow of drug organizations. Drug traffickers, like any 
multinational corporation require a constant source of capital 
to finance operations. Traffickers use drug profits to fund 
their business, support lavish lifestyles, and increase their 
wealth and power. 
The drug control strategy seeking to disrupt and destroy 
drug trafficking organizations has failed. Bec3.use the demand 
for drugs continues to remain high, additional measures have 
been instituted to supplement efforts. To effectively deny 
drug trafficking organizations the ability to transfer, 
invest, and enjoy the profits of their business, policy-
41 
planners have targeted money laundering operations as an 
integral part to strategy success. 73 
Money laundering has been a problem for a long time but it 
seems to have grown recently in both scope and volume. In 
1982, one of the earlier, more noteworthy money laundering 
cases in the United States, was the Great American Bank of 
Dade County, Florida, which was charged with laundering $96 
million for drug traffickers. 74 
Latin America was targeted by money laundering 
organizations in the late 1970s, with the rise of drug 
trafficking. By 1979, money laundering had become well 
established in Panama. Even with the collapse of the Manuel 
Noriega regime as a result of the U.S. invasion in Panama, it 
still remains a money laundering center. In the Caribbean, 
Jamaica (1981), the Bahamas, Barbados, Curacao (1983), and 
Trinidad and Tobago (1986) all had been sites of extreme money 
laundering operations. 
In Latin America, nations including Colombia, Venezuela, 75 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador have all been centers for money 
laundering. 76 
nNational Drug Control Strategy 1994, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., January 1994, 43. 
74
"Miami' s Great American Bank of Dade Count--;/ used by South 
American Narcotics Traffickers to Launder Drug Profit Money," 
Miami Herald, 14 December 1982. 
75Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche, Cocaine 
and Power in the Andean States and Panama, Praeger, 1989, 9. 
~Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, False Profits, The Inside 
Story of The World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire, Houghton 
Miffin, 1992, 211. 
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With the cocaine trade centered in Colombia, banking 
institutions have, as a result, experienced considerable 
growth. In 1983, the BCCI acquired a Colombian bank, and added 
seven more new branches by 1987, all involved in extensive 
money laundering operations. As part of its anti-money 
laundering operations, the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and Justice Department, arrested and 
extradicted Eduardo Martinez, chief financial officer for the 
Medellin cartel in Colombia. Martinez revealed at that time, 
that he had laundered more than $1.1 billion in the United 
States during 1989 for drug traffickers. 77 
Presently, the most active region for money laundering 
operations are the Cayman, and British Virgin Islands. In the 
BVI, banking institutions in 197 4 totaled 10 0. By 1994, 
current estimates numbered banking establishmen·.:s in excess of 
550. Today, international economists estimate that over 60 
percent of the world's money both legitimate and illegal, 
resides offshore. 78 
Money laundering operations combine a lucrative mixture of 
legitimate banking services with illegal methods of money 
management. Typically, these institutions, on the request of 
the client will establish an anonymous corporation that 
ultimately covers the identity of the.client. The bank, acting 
as director of the false corporation retains all signatory 
authority to conduct financial transactions. The total number 
of registered corporations in the British Virgin Islands alone 
has increased from 5000 in 1974, to over 120,000 in 1994. 
77FBIS-LAT-93-190, Colombia, 4 October 1993. 
78Gavin Hewitt, "Hot Money," Frontline, 1 November 1994. 
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British laws governing banking operations in their 
territories require client confidentiality, thus limiting any 
investigative. efforts by U.S. authorities. This allows drug 
traffickers to operate anywhere in the world, with no visible 
ties to any bank or account. Profits deposited by drug 
traffickers are professionally managed through distribution 
and investment of funds in legitimate businesses throughout 
the world. 
To attack the money laundering problem, U.S. policy-makers 
have attempted on several occasions to implement measures that 
target drug profits. Initial efforts integrated the Bank 
Secrecy Act of 1970 with modern money laundering operations. 
Originally intended to target tax cheaters, this law 
included the Currency Transaction Report (CTR), which requires 
financial institutions to report transactions of $10,000 or 
more. 79 
Until the passage of the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986, money laundering was not actually defined as illegal. 
Additional legislation introduced the Money Laundering 
Prosecution Improvement Act of 1988, and the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988 which included several key areas in countering 
money laundering operations. The CTR concept has shown some 
positive results in "cooperation" with financial institutions 
as indicated by Figure 3-5. 80 It does not however prove a 
substantial reduction in money laundering operations. To 
7~oney Laundering: The U.S. Government Is Responding to 
the Problem, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-91-130, 
May 1991. 
80Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System, a National Report, 
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 
Department of Justice, NJC-133652, December 1992, 154. 
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counter this legislation, drug traffickers use "smurfing" or 
structuring, the legal conversion of cash in amounts less than 
$10,000. 
To promote international efforts, the U.S. established a 
Financial Task Force designed to combat money laundering with 
the participation of several other countries at the United 
Nations Convention of 1988. At the 1989 Economic Summit 
in Houston, the United States was the principal advocate in 
establishing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF I) that 
introduced recommendations challenging international money 
laundering. The 1990 Economic Summit produced FATF II, a 
five year program to achieve a broad-based international 
agreement against money laundering. The United States also 
. 45 
U.S. Department of Treasury 
Currency Transaction Reporting (CTR) 




Figure 3-5. U.S. Dept of Treasury C~r,ency 
Transaction Reporting (CTR) 
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participated in more regionally-focused efforts with the 1990 
Caribbean Drug Money Laundering Conference and the 
Organization of American States' Financial Action Initiative. 
To consolidate interagency cooperation with financial 
information, the U.S. Treasury established the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Center Network (FINCEN). Its mission is 
(1) to disrupt money laundering operations by denying access 
to legitimate channels of banking by money launderers; (2) to 
identify, freeze, and seize assets; and (3) to indict, 
arrest, and prosecute individuals involved with money 
laundering operations. 81 As a sign of progress, in Colombia 
the Attorney General's Office had no fewer than 4,200 
corruption cases under investigation involving the national 
police, and 1,700 cases involving the armed forces, by late 
1989. 82 Additionally, in a recent joint effort by the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service, "Operation Dinero" recently penetrated the Cali 
cartels operation, and resulted in the seizure of $52 million 
in cash and assets in five countries, nine tons of cocaine, 
and 8 8 arrests. 83 
Critics of both drug war and money laundering policy argue 
that most efforts have been ineffective due to the following: 
(1) the economy of many nations are financially dependent upon 
the drug trade and stand to lose more by cooperation; (2) 
several countries are wary of penalizing legitimate financial 
81Pierre Thomas, "Six Colombian's Indicted In Atlanta On 
Drug-Money Laundering Charges," Washington Post, 28 June 1994. 
82Miami Herald, 3 0 November 198 9. 
83
"Cali Drug Cartel's Operations Penetrated,., Monterey 
Herald, 17 December 1994. 
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transactions; ( 3) the nations impacted by money laundering 
have different perceptions of U.S. antidrug policy, and 
different ideas on policy implementation; 84 and ( 4) U.S. 
decision-makers often have been impatient requiring immediate 
results, while the fight against money laundering is a long-
term battle. 85 
With many countries promoting banking secrecy, the 
requirement to obtain evidence from foreign banks by U.S. 
investigators has been extremely difficult. The cooperation 
U.S. investigators receive in money laundering cases can 
depend upon the U.S. relationship with that nation, its 
susceptibility to U.S. pressure, and that nation's perception 
of how its cooperation will affect its financial well-being. 86 
When investigators encounter difficulties, they must often use 
foreign lawyers, or go through a lengthy process involving the 
U.S. State Department overseas. In some natior.s, cooperating 
banks will notify its clients, alerting them that action is 
required. 
In conclusion, the centralization of control in the United 
States for anti-money laundering operations can be critisized 
as being inefficient, biased, and a disruptive response to 
international law enforcement. The United States needs not to 
centralize power, and authority, that infringes upon foreign 
8~ary Beth Sheridan, "Colombia Preparing Plan To Fight Money 
Laundering," Miami Herald, 6 September 1994. 
85Illicit Narcotics, Recent Efforts to Control Chemical 
Diversion and Money Laundering, U.S. General Accounting Office, 
GAO/NSAID-93-34, December 1993, 3. 
86Ethan Nadelmann, "Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad, 
U.S. Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions," 
Inter-American Law Review, 1986, 18. 
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sovereignty, but fully participate in joint and cooperative 
efforts that target criminal organizations. 87 
To succeed in the campaign against money laundering, the 
United States must impose stricter banking legislation world-
wide, by expanding legislative efforts to fully criminalize 
all direct, and peripheral aspects in money laundering 
operations. The United States needs to enhance asset 
forfeiture programs, and use those seizures to fund future 
money laundering investigations. The key issue remaining for 
the United States is to continue emphasis on improving foreign 
relations. International cooperation is critical, and must 
include emphasizing the removal of legislative, and banking 
barriers, such as bank secrecy laws, and placing limitations 
on bank "holding company" management. This cooperation should 
also target international banking and non-banking 
institutions, as well as assisting foreign nations involved in 
regional money laundering investigations. 
Past performance of U.S. policy toward Latin America must 
be restructured to better integrate with the region in the 
post cold war era. Inadequate U.S. financial aid for antidrug 
programs (as described in previous sections III.A.3), the past 
history of coercive policy implementation by the United States 
must all be adjusted to improve cooperation with foreign 
nations. 
87Donald J. Mabry, The Latin American Narcotics Trade and 
U.S. National Security, Greenwood, 1989, 120. 
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3. Foreign Assistance Programs 
The United States has focused most of its antidrug 
assistance on the Andean nations of Latin America. Of the 
international drug budget, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru 
received 59 percent of $633 million in 1991, and 59 percent of 
the $690 million in 1992. In 1992, these funds were 
distributed as follows: 62 percent toward economic assistance, 
36 percent for the military, and the remaining 2 percent for 
DOD-provided equipment. The United States supports antidrug 
efforts financially in the Andean nations through the 
International Narcotics Control Pre gram. Major 
responsibilities are assigned to three primary agencies: (1) 
the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics 
Matters (INM); (2) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); 
and (3) the Agency for International Developmen~. The INM has 
overall responsibility for financing antidrug efforts, and is 
represented in U.S. embassies in both Bogota, Colombia, and 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
The roots for financial aid programs to Colombia were 
established with the Foreign Assistance Ac~ of 1961, a 
framework for U.S. bilateral assistance to (Jther nations. 
There are four basic goals that are targeted by this program: 
(1) policy advisement to recipients; (2) research and 
technology transfer; ( 3) institution-building· for expanded 
national growth; and (4) promotion of private sector growth. 88 
88 Foreign Aid, Problems and Issues Affecting Economic 
Assistance, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-89-61BR, 
December 1988, 8. 
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The following section highlights U.S. financial programs 
implemented to assist Colombian antidrug efforts. 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 506 (A) (1) 
In 1989, $65 million in emergency assistance went to 
Colombia after one of its presidential candidates was 
assassinated by suspected drug cartel members. This provided 
for military equipment to combat drug trafficking. 89 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 506 (A) (2) 
In 1990, $2 0 million in emergency assistance went to 
Co~ombia, although that country was in a state of emergency, 
which had been declared by the president in 1989. This 
program provided $17 million for the Colombian military, and 
$3 million for law enforcement. At this time however, 
ammunition and weapons were not delivered due to United States 
involvement in the Gulf War. 90 
Foreign Military Financing Program Assistance 
Under section 3 of the International Narcotics Control Act 
of 1989, counternarcotics law enforcement and military aid 
was authorized to Colombia. In 1990, $48.8 million in 
89Drug War, Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia, 
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSAID 91-296, 1991, 29. 
90Ibid, 30. 
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assistance was authorized. 91 That figure increased to $106 
million in 1991, $117.1 million in 1992, and $137 million in 
19 9 3 . 92 Financing was provided for military equipment, the 
training of specialized troops, weapons, and ammunition. 
Program restrictions however, allowed only approximately one 
third of the funds to be delivered to Colombia due to the 
following: (1) U.S. administrators felt Colombia was utilizing 
the funds for counter-insurgency operations; ( 2) bilateral 
agreements had not yet been signed; and (3)letters of "offe-
and acceptance", between the U.S., and Colombia were not 
complete. 
U.S. State Department International Narcotics Control 
Assistance Section 481 
Developed as part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
this State Department program has provided funds to law 
enforcement agencies under the International Narcotics Control 
Program. In 1990, $10 million was allocated. pistribution of 
funds included $8 million to the Colombian National Police for 
spare parts and tools to maintain equipment, $1 million for 
judicial protection, and $1 million for national education and 
awareness programs. 93 
91 Ibid, 31. 
92National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary 1992, the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the 
President, Washington, D.C., January 1992, 152. 
93Drug War, Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia, 
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSAID 91-296; 1991, 32. 
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Defense Department Assistance 
In 1990, $5 million was provided for improvement of 
intelligence capabilities for law enforcement and military 
agencies conducting antidrug operations. 
Other Foreign Military Financing Program Assistance 
As part of the Foreign Operations Export Financing and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1990, $3 million was 
provided for equipment, weapons, ammunition, and police 
helicopters. 
Export - Import Bank Loans 
Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, $200 million in 
loan guarantees were provided to Colombia for 1989 and 1990. 
The Export-Import Bank will guarantee 85 percent of any loan 
value, if Colombia can guarantee the remainder. Under this 
program, Colombia has purchased $84 million in equipment for 
antidrug operations. 94 
In conclusion, although millions of dollars have been 
transferred to the Andean nations for antidrug efforts, there 
has been little success as a result of the funding programs. 
For example, between August 1989 and September 1990, the 
United States provided or programmed to Colombia $236 million 
in antidrug assistance for military and law enforcement 
agencies, $65 million in emergency aid, $122 million in grant 
94Ibid, 34. 
- 53 
aid, and $84 million in loan guarantees. During the same 
period, the United States provided Peru $19 million in law 
enforcement aid. 
Most critics argue that although U.S. efforts appear 
genuine, they leave financial aid recipients very little 
flexibility. An example is the planning of financial aid 
packages for antidrug operations. The U.S. Congress 
specifically demanded that antidrug funds not be used for 
combating insurgency. Critics argue that drug traffickers and 
insurgency groups in many Latin American nations are tied 
together. For example, the Revolutionary A;:·med Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), an insurgency group, has not only established 
relations with drug cartels, but conducts drug trafficking 
operations. Documentation obtained by authorities indicated 
that FARC leaders had instructed members in seven of its 33 
fronts to extort from drug traffickers, totalling $563,380 
monthly. 95 
The following represents a partial list of reasons that 
have been posited to explain why U.S. assistance programs are 
not effective in targeting drug trafficking in Colombia: (1) 
traditionally, the civilian and police agencies of Colombia 
maintain weak planning programs for policy implementation; (2) 
Colombia is at war with both drug traffickers, and insurgency 
groups, thus hindering efforts in direct antidrug operations; 
(3) drug cartels in Colombia have expanded their operations 
to include heroin production, and opium cultivation; 
meanwhile authorities are still struggling tc overcome the 
cocaine problem; and finally ( 4) although Colombia is the 
95
"Doubts over FARC' s Peace Commitment," Andean Group Report: 
Rand, RA-89-04, 22 January 1989. 
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center for cocaine distribution, the drug problem is regional. 
Therefore, Colombian antidrug programs will only succeed if 
regional programs are effective as well. 96 
Some critics argue that U.S. financial aid for antidrug 
programs is to restrictive, and refer to various measures 
proposed by the U.S. government as coercive tools to ensure 
cooperation by aid recipients. The United States has the 
options to: ( 1) invoke a 50 percent suspension of economic 
assistance in any fiscal year for non-compliance of U.S. 
policy guidelines when a source country is not cooperating; 
(2) to invoke a 100 percent suspension of economic assistance 
for any source nation that fails to certify (full cooperation 
with U.S. policy); (3) threaten to vote against source nations 
when they apply for loans through multilateral banks; ( 4) 
fail to allocate sugar quotas to source nations; (5) threaten 
to invoke duty increases, up to 50 percent of the value on 
source nations exports to the United States; (6) institute an 
interruption of air transportation and commercial traffic to 
and from source nations; and (7) withdraw U.S. participation 
in pre-clearance customs agreements with that source nation. 97 
Some critics argue that the U.S. Congress has developed a 
coercive policy that leaves limited flexibility for other 
nations to follow. During the cold war era, coercive 
diplomacy by the United States worked quite effectively 
throughout Latin America. With the constant threat of 
96The Drug War, Colombia is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, 
but Impact is Uncertain, U.S. General Accounting Office, 
GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, 5 October 1993, 5. 
97Raphael Perl, "International NarcoPolicy and The Role of 
the U.S. Congress," in Donald Mabrys, eds., The Latin American 
Drug Trade and U.S. National Security (Greenwood, 1989), 92-93. 
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communist expansion by the former Soviet Union, Latin American 
nations had little choice but to accept U.S. pressure. 
Presently, however, Latin American nations do have more 
latitude as U.S. policy-makers are learning. U.S. influence 
does not carry the same weight it once did, and coercion must 
be replaced with flexible policy measures to ensure 
cooperation and regional improvement. 
Future U.S. policy must allow for flexibility on the part 
of the governments of drug source nations in the use of funds 
to combat drug traffickers, as well as insurgents. 98 
U.S. policy-makers must improve the control of programs and 
the management of financial assistance to better monitor 
policy achievements. This can be achieved by improving 
relations between United States embassy personnel and their 
counterparts, and by bettering relations with foreign military 
and police agencies. 
4. Corruption 
Corruption is often associated with dru<; t'. :::1:::l.e. Throughout 
government, military, and security forces of ~.<.:tin American 
source countries, lies the potential, and in ~any cases, the 
presence of corruption linked to the drug trade. This 
consequently results in compromising the professionalism, 
integrity, and effectiveness of those involved in antidrug 
efforts. It also contributes to destablizing democratic 
governments. It is difficult to strengthen democratic 
98The Drug War: Counter-narcotics Programs in Colombia 
and Peru, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, 
20 February 1992, 2. 
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institutions when money from illegal narcotics buy police, 99 
military personnel, politicians, 100 and public officials . 101 
Drug traffickers, unlike insurgency groups, do not desire 
to overthrow the national government. Their use of corruption 
is a means to protect themselves from authorities while 
continuing operations. Essentially, corruption is an avenue 
of protection for drug traffickers, by those who are 
successfully bribed. 
Those who succumb to corruption do so for two distinct 
reasons. The first is obviously the financial benefit. When 
those in authority acquire wealth, power and prestige follow. 
The second and more critical reason is survival. Drug 
traffickers are notorious for using violence against those who 
are uncooperative. To better illustrate the existence of 
narcocorruption, several examples are provided. 
In Colombia, from 1973 to 1974, there were 16.8 murders 
per 100,000 people. By 1987, there were 52. 8 murders per 
100,000 people. This translated into the murders of 16,200 
that year, which was considered the worst year for such 
violence. 102 Contrasting this figure with the United States, 
99
"0fficial, Cali Cartel Bribes Police," Miami Herald, 
20 August 1994. 
100
"Drug Lords, We Offered Cash to Candidates," Miami Herald, 
14 July 1994. 
1
mChristopher Marquis and Gerardo Reyes, "Scandal Taints 
Colombia's New Leader," Miami Herald, 23 June 1994. 
102James M. Malloy, Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary 
Record, Holmes and Meier, 1990, 794. 
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estimates confirm that there were 17, 963 murders with 4. 9 
percent being drug-related. 103 
In 1987, drug related violence against public figures in 
Colombia resulted in the death of over 50 judge magistrates, 
12 journalists, and over 400 military personnel and 
policemen. 104 
A Colombian policeman who earns $128 a month may receive 
an additional $225 a month from drug traffickers. A police 
captain who earns $18 0 a month may receive as much as an 
additional $5000 a month from drug traffickers. 105 
While traveling in Colombia, Pablo Escobar, the former 
leader of the Medellin cartel in Colombia, was stopped at a 
police check point outside Medellin in November 198 6. To 
avoid apprehension, Escobar reportedly paid police officials 
$250,000 to $350,000. 106 
In an effort to combat drug-related corruption within its 
ranks, in 1989 the Colombian military released 2,100 personnel 
including 130 officers. In a similar fashion, the National 
Police released over 2000 police officers including the former 
commander of the National Police. Offenses connected to 
1mDrugs and Crime Facts 1992, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 
NCJ-139561, March 1993, 8. 
104James M. Malloy, Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary 
Record, Holmes and Meier, 1990, 796. 
105J. B. Treaster, "Colombian Policemen and Soldiers 
are Reportedly Tipping Off Drug Figures," New York Times, 
4 September 1989. 
106Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Cocaine Dilemma in South 
America," in Donald Mabrys, eds., The Latin American Drug Trade 
and U.S. National Security (Greenwood, 1989), 66. 
- 58 
drug traffickers included corruption, weapons smuggling, and 
participation in terrorist acts. 1~ 
The Attorney General's Office of Colombia reported that 
an army captain and two lieutenants assigned to prison duty 
while Pablo Escobar was incarcerated received 500,000 pesos a 
piece each time they allowed the entry of vehicles, portable 
phones, books, motorcycles and other items. 108 
In May 1991, the three Ochoa brothers, former leaders of 
the Medellin cartel in Colombia, surrendered under the 
Colombian government's new policy immunity from extradition to 
the United States. 
operate one of 
Although incarcerated, they continued to 
the largest drug trafficking networks 
in Latin America from a special prison outside Medellin. 
As the previous examples indicate, corruption is wide-
spread, and reaches everywhere. Using Colombia as a case 
study has suggested exactly how successful drug traffickers 
are at implementing their policy. Colombian officials have 
generally been given two choices regarding corruption, accept 
or be killed. 
Sources indicate that the pressure was so extreme by cartel 
members in Medellin, that an estimated 80 percent of police 
officials had been corrupted. 109 
In conclusion, U.S. policy-makers must assess the level of 
drug-related corruption in formulating and implementing 
antidrug policies. 
107A. Oppenheimer, "Drug Traffickers Corrupt, Infiltrate 
Colombian Forces," Miami Herald, 30 September 1989. 
108FBIS-LAT-93-176, Colombia, 14 September 1993. 
109 James Inciardi, Handbook of Drug Control in the United 
States, Greenwood, 1990, 330. 
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B. POLITICAL RELATED ARGUMENTS 
The U.S. war against drugs is a political issue. Initial 
attempts to consolidate antidrug efforts were conducted 
politically, through the creation of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in 1973. Subsequent action for drug war 
efforts all evolved from some type of political action: the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988; the creation of the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy; the National Drug 
Control Strategy; and the Andean Initiative. 
Critics of the drug war contend that the failure of the 
drug war has political roots. The following provides some of 
the more common arguments. 
1. U.S. Military Employment Inappropriate 
Various critics have argued that the militarization of the 
war on drugs is inappropriate, not cost effective, and 
detrimental to foreign relations. The following provides 
some of the most common arguments that criticize U.S. military 
involvement in the war on drugs, and will include 
recommendations. They include: (A) source nation civil-
military relations; (B) source nation politica: sovereignty; 
(C) source nation political and public support; (D) current 
drug policy failure; (E) military role in law enforcement as 
inappropriate; (F) U.S. civil-military relations; and (G) cost 
ineffectiveness. 
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(A) Source Nation Civil-~litary Relations 
Historically, the militaries in Latin America have been 
influential political actors. In many instances the military 
have been so strong, that civilian governrnents have had 
difficulty in controlling them. This argument maintains that 
as the United States strengthens a source nation's 
military and police forces (a goal for the U.S. Department of 
Defense in the antidrug role), it concommitantly decreases 
that nation's civilian control of the military. This could 
destabilize democracy in the source country. 110 
When coordinating antidrug policy, U.S. decision-makers 
should consider all types of assistance given and the possible 
consequences of that assistance if not carefully monitored. 
Maintaining minimal U.S. military presence for antidrug 
operations in Latin America can be accomplished through 
embassy and military action group (MAG) assig~ments. 
(B) Source Nation Political and Public Support 
Some Latin American nations have a poor record concerning 
human rights. If the people are continually targeted by 
military and police forces that are conducting antidrug 
operations, the public support for such efforts is likely to 
diminish. Complementing this lack of support is the strain 
upon that nation's political structure. 
110The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious 
Obstacles, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-NSAID-92-36, 
October 1991, 23. 
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Counter-drug operations are often portrayed as infringements 
on the civil liberties of its citizens. When antidrug efforts 
are tied to virtually all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, 
Latin American politicians also consider its coercive 
implementation as infringing upon the that nation's 
sovereignty. When told what to do, rather than being given 
the choice to cooperate, the nation sacrifices the ability to 
make its own decisions. More conservative Latin American 
politicians view narcodiplomacy as a means to enhance their 
personal wealth, power, and prestige by using their positions 
to acquire access to U.S. funding and drug corruption money. 
This is revealed by the widespread corruption that accompanies 
the drug trade. 
The United States has consistently accused Latin American 
source nations of not making antidrug programs a priority 
issue. The reason however, is quite logical. The belief is 
strong in most Latin American nations that illegal drug 
trafficking is not so much their problem, but a problem of 
the United States with its 10 million drug abusers. 
(C) Military Role in Law Enforcement as Inappropriate 
Drug abuse and the myriad of problems associated with it 
are social issues and do not fall under the roles and missions 
traditionally or legally given to the military. Even with the 
vast resources and extensive capabilities of the U.S. DefeLse 
Department, its structure, training and equipment is built 
around military-to-military confrontations and not law 
enforcement activities. Directing DOD assets to be utilized 
in a law enforcement role, as in antidrug operations, will 
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reduce military readiness that provides for the national 
security of the United States. 
(D) U.S. Civil-~litary Relations 
The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits Army and Air Force 
personnel from conducting law enforcement activity and 
subsequent DOD regulations provide the same restrictions for 
the Navy. These measures were emplqyed by civilians to protect 
civilians from abuse by federal armed forces. If U.S. 
military forces were to intervene domestically in antidrug 
efforts, the civil liberties of U.S. citizens would be 
jeopardized. Critics argue that this could eventually lead to 
mi 1 i tary forces gaining too much strength in the civilian 
sector with no checks and balances. 
(E) Cost Effectiveness 
The expenditures of U.S. military efforts in countering 
illegal drug trafficking have been significant. Financial 
problems exist, starting with the chaotic bureaucracy that 
accompanies antidrug funding. There are so many different 
agencies involved, that there is no real centralized control 
over allocation of financial resources. 111 There is a 
considerable struggle between federal, state, and local 
agencies in the counter-drug war. Future military force 
structure reductions and budget cuts would leave forces with 
mG. Witkin, "How Politics Ruined Drug War Planning," 
U.S. News & World Report, 22 February 1993. 
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less assets, taking on more commitments, with less money to 
fund operations. 
In conclusion, critics of the current drug strategy agree 
that the solution is not to be found solely in the source 
and/or transshipment nations, but in the demand-side of the 
problem as well. If U.S. military forces are to continue with 
drug-interdiction operations, the following concepts should be 
considered. 
The first key to successful drug interdiction is accurate 
and shared intelligence. This was one of the assigned 
missions to the military by the Defense Authorization Act of 
1989, and voiced as a major concern by participating law 
enforcement agencies involved in antidrug efforts. 
The second key to successful drug interdiction is a single 
chain of command. Current efforts involve many different 
agencies, and assets with no centralized control. This is one 
significant problem that will continue to strain effectiveness 
in t·he antidrug policy. 
The third key to successful drug interdiction is a 
collective communication network that allows all participating 
forces to communicate securely. The absence of a real time 
communications capability severely impacts thE effectiveness 
of mission performance. 
The final key to successful drug interdiction are clear 
rules of engagement. Just as in military operations, 
antidrug operations must have clear and concise guidelines for 
participating forces. It is understandable that drug 
traffickers will not follow those guidelines, but for military 
personnel, pre-established rules must apply. The military as 
a warfighting institution lacks law enforceme~t training and 
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experience that law enforcement agencies possess, thus cannot 
be expected to conduct antidrug missions with proficiency. 
To continue with U.S. military involvement in antidrug 
operations, it is recommended that military procedural 
guidelines provide law enforcement training that ensures 
operational readiness for the mission (antidrug), and to 
remove restrictive measures (Posse Comitatus) placed upon 
military assets during such operations. 112 
2. Drug Cartels Are Too Powerful 
The drug cartels of Colombia have created extremely chaotic 
conditions throughout much of Latin America both socially and 
politically. Their awesome level of power and influence is 
derived from the drug profits, well organized drug networks, 
well trained private armies, and by implementing violence when 
necessary to achieve their goals. Their capabilities are so 
extensive, that in many cases their resources are far more 
advanced than those of the host nation in which they operate. 
Drug traffickers possess significant supplies of money. 
This enables them to acquire the most sophisticated 
intelligence networks, superior communications, aircraft, 
surface vessels, transportation vehicles, and state of the 
art weaponry. 113 Drug organizations have access to the most 
advanced technology because of their financial might. 
112House of Representitives and Senate Hearing, The Role of 
the Military in Drug Interdiction, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, May and June 1988, 34. 
113Donald J. Mabry, "Andean Drug Trafficking and the Military 
Option," Military Review, March 1990, 33. 
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The type of weaponry that drug organizations possess is 
illustrated by the following. In February 1988, a joint 
U.S. -Mexican investigation of Colombian and Mexican drug 
organizations resulted in the seizure of 360 AK-47 assault 
rifles, 145,000 rounds of ammunition, six U.S.- made military 
rifles, metal detectors, infra-red rifles scopes, and 92 
bayonets. 114 
Narcoterrorism is considered one of the most important 
challenges confronting the Andean source nation governments. 115 
With Latin American insurgency groups becoming· more involved 
with drug trafficking, this presents a double-edged sword for 
legitimate forces to target. The drug traffickers are willing 
to commit exceptionally violent acts in order to achieve 
operational success. The following incidents reveal just how 
far these drug organizations are willing to go. During the 
period from 1981 to 1990, 2,250 Colombian National Police were 
killed in action while conducting antidrug and counter-
insurgency operations. In 1984, the Justice Minister of 
Colombia was assassinated by suspected members of the Medellin 
cartel. In 1985, a Colombian insurgent group financed by drug 
traffickers seized the Colombian Palace of Justice, and killed 
12 Supreme Court Justices. 116 
114William Branigan, "Mexico Cracks Arms, Drug Trafficking 
Ring," Washington Post, 26 February 1988. 
115Eduardo Crawley, "The Drugs Trade in Latin America," 
Latin American Newsletters, Confidential Report-1, 1992, 18. 
116Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ-1336~·2, December 
1992, 56. 
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In conclusion, when combining the wealth, resources, and 
will of the drug organizations, government institutions in 
Latin America seem to have little chance of overcoming the 
cartels. As previously discussed, dismantling and destroying 
drug organizations seems to have had almost no impact on the 
continued flow of cocaine throughout the world. Just as 
during Prohibition, if the demand for a product is high, there 
will always be the presence of the criminal element. It is 
recommended that increased emphasis be placed upon reducing 
the demand for illegal drugs in the United States. 
3. The U.S. Lacks a Legitimate Antidrug Regime 
For drug policies to work effectively, an antidrug 
"regime", as argued by Bruce Michael Bac;,ley and Juan 
Tokatlian, must include three primary concepts. They are 
legitimacy, credibility, and symmetry. An a~:alysis of the 
U.S. National Drug Control Policy reveals that all three 
concepts have been lacking. The lack of legitimacy in U.S. 
drug policy is reflected by the fact that although some Latin 
American nations clearly understand the guidelines of antidrug 
policy, they do not consistently enforce them. The 
unilaterally-developed U.S. drug policy is the basis for this 
perceived lack of legitimacy in the drug war efforts. Latin 
American nations feel no obligation to truly adhere to such 
policy, believing the real problem lies in the united States, 
where illegal drugs are consumed. 
Increased U.S. pressure through threatened economic 
sanctions forced the Andean nations to comply with the U.S. 
regional antidrug policy. These nations had acKnowledged the 
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presence of a drug problem within their own region. However, 
the drug problem was not considered a national security issue 
until narco-violence directly targeted public and political 
officials. Narco-violence, in turn, escalated when the Latin 
American nations involved with U.S. antidrug efforts were 
forced to comply with U.S. demands. Colombia, for example, 
has an extremely violent history. 
Another issue regarding the lack of legitimacy in the 
antidrug policy was the planning and implementation of the 
Andean Initiative. Although defined as a multilateral 
agreement, U.S. policy-makers unilaterally developed the 
strategy as defined in the Senate Hearing on the Andean 
Initiative, and subsequently demanded compliance of the 
Andean nations. The Andean Initiative was not a cooperative 
agreement, and did not employ cooperative measures, but 
coercion to implement strategy. Policy measures are 
instituted with the enticement of reward, or the constant 
threat of economic sanctions. 
The second concept encompasses the lack of credibility in 
the U.S. drug policy and is defined by the use of a strategy 
that employs unrealistic measures to achieve its intended 
goals. The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy and the 
Andean Initiative focus almost exclusively en supply-side 
efforts, leaving limited emphasis on demand. Historically, 
U.S. antidrug policy has targeted supply-side efforts with 75 
percent of the strategy funding, leaving only 25 percent for 
demand-related programs. The Bush adininistration proposed 
that funding be restructured, directly 40 percent to supply-
side efforts, and the remaining 60 percent to demand. This, 
however, was not achieved as reflected previously in Figure 
2-1. 
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The final problem that plagues the effectiveness of the 
U.S. antidrug regime internationally is the lack of symmetry, 
which is defined by the failure to fairly distribute the costs 
and benefits of program management. This argurrtent focuses on 
the realization that the United States has not allocated the 
burdens of the drug war equitably between itself and the Latin 
American nations. 
The United States, in implementing antidrug policy among 
the Andean nations, has failed to account for the positive 
impact the drug trade has had on the Latin American 
economies. 117 The drug trade in the early 1990s is estimated 
to have produced an annual return of $7 billion to the 
Colombian economy alone. In Colombia for example, the 
Medellin cartel's leader, Pablo Escobar, had personally 
financed several public housing projects and provided food and 
amenities for the poor. 
In conclusion, consideration of the Bagley and Tokatlian 
argument is essential in recommending policy. The lack of 
legitimacy is accentuated by the fact that the United States 
has employed a unilateral drug policy in a multilateral forum. 
It has not realistically allowed the Andean nations to be part 
of the decision-making mechanism of current policy issues. 
Decision-makers must provide for joint, multilateral planning, 
and decision-making for all facets of antidrug policy to 
effectively work. 
117John A. Peeler, "Elite Settlements and Democratic 
Consolidation, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela," in 
John Higley and Richard Gunthers, eds., Elites and Democratic 
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 107. 
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The U.S. antidrug policy also lacks credibility. Its 
objectives have clearly exceeded any realistic means to 
achieve set goals. The limited resources allocated to the 
Andean nations, and their perceived lack of dedication, have 
clearly made an impact. Policy-makers must consider the full 
scope of this problem from both a U.S. and Latin American 
perspective. Policy-makers need to be realistic when balancing 
assistance with expected results. 
In terms of symmetry, U.S. policy-makers have expected 
Latin American nations to aggressively attack the drug issue, 
while ignoring the reality that illegal drugs are not so much 
a Latin American issue, but a demand issue centered in the 
United States. Latin American nations have been forced to 
conduct the war on drugs with limited resources and heavy 
U.S. restrictions. In this context, U~S. Drug Control Strategy 
has failed. 118 
4. U.S. Government Illegal Drug Activity 
Case: Iran - Contra 
While on the surface it appears that the Un:L ted States has 
made serious attempts to eliminate (reduce) the international 
drug problem through the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy 
and the Andean Initiative, each of which reflect genuine 
planning efforts, observers in both the United States and 
Latin America have cause to question the sincerity of the 
118Bruce Michael Bagley and Juan G. Tokatliar ... , "Explaining 
The Failure of the U.S.-Latin Drug Policies," The United States 
and Latin America in the 1990s, Beyond the Coldl1~ar (The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 214-234. 
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efforts. The Iran-Contra scandal and disclosure that resulted 
have (severely) damaged the perception of U.S. motives. 119 
Sources have confirmed that several members of the United 
States government were involved in clandestine drug 
trafficking operations linked with the Iran - Contra arms 
shipments. Various defendants testified that U.S. authorities 
did indeed have knowledge of the drug operations. Those 
defendants include: Milian Rodriguez, chief bookkeeper for 
the Medellin cartel in Colombia; Jose Blandon, chief of 
intelligence for Manuel Noriega in Panama, and John Hull, an 
American residing in Costa Rica, and considered the central 
point of the drug operation. Hull, who was indicted for 
massive cocaine trafficking, established U.S. political ties 
when he reportedly met with then Senator Dan Quayle in 1983 
during a visit to Washington, D.C. Through a chain of 
introductions, Hull was finally linked with Oliver North. 
Hull had also established relationships with several other CIA 
operatives including: Robert Owen, Oliver North's personal 
liaison for Contra operations; and CIA's station chief in 
Costa Rica, Jose [Joe] Fernandez . 120 
With CIA operations providing inte-lligence and 
transportation for the Contra arms shipments, it stands to 
reason that the CIA managed drug operations as well. Several 
substantiating facts reveal the CIA's drug connection. 
According to the Kerry Report, the Ilopango Airport in El 
119Bruce McGraw, "Bush's Fraudulent Drug War, The Contra-Drug 
Connection," The Truth Seeker, September-October 1989. 
1wPeter Dale Scott and Jonathon Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 
Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America, University of 
California Press, 1991, 118. 
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Salvador had specific hangers designated for Contra 
operations, and were reported to be used by aircraft carrying 
cocaine. 121 In March 1987, a C-47 cargo plane under joint 
U.S.-Colombian registry was shot down in Hor.duran airspace 
after failing to identify itself. Although both Pentagon and 
Honduran officials all denied the aircraft's involvement in 
Contra operations, investigating authorities reported that 
the aircraft had been under surveillance for some time, and 
was suspected to have been used in drug trafficking 
operations. 122 Gerado Duran, a former Contra operation pilot 
from Costa Rica, testified, after being arrested in January 
1986, that on several occasions he had flown planeloads of 
cocaine into the United States. 123 
When investigating the financial transactions of Contra 
operations, several were reportedly tied t0 known front 
organizations of drug trafficking cartels. There was also 
financial evidence linking Contra operations with several 
Miami-based cocaine trafficking organizations. Records reveal 
the names of Ted Shakley, Tom Clines, and Richard Secord, all 
involved with Iran-Contra and all previously released from CIA 
employment during the Carter administration, who had set up 
links with Latin American drug cartels during their government 
employment. 
121Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Drugs, Law 
Enforcement, and Foreign Policy, U.S. Governmen~ Printing Office, 
1989, 37. 
122William Branigan, "Honduras Shoots Down lr:.:_dentified 
Plane," Washington Post, 11 March 1987. 
123 Ibid, 4 9. 
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In The Big White Lie, Michael Levine reported that in 1984 
a DEA agent in Tegucigalpa, Honduras had documented proof of 
a Honduran military-CIA connection that was responsible for 
the shipment of over 50 tons of cocaine to the United States 
during a 15 month period. Considering the bureaucratic 
sensitivity of this operation with CIA involvement, the DEA 
agent, after exposing this information to his superiors, was 
subsequently removed from his post and the Honduran office of 
the DEA was closed. 124 Levine goes further by presenting 
rumors that at least one of the biggest cocaine labs in 
Huanchaca, Bolivia, being run by the CIA. 125 
In conclusion, one must consider how the U.S. National 
Drug Control Strategy can maintain integrity in the £ace of 
alleged U.S. government covert operations. The Iran-Contra 
affair, CIA involvement in the Bolivian cocaine coup of 
1981, 126 and operation "Pseudo Miranda" as descn .. bed by Kenneth 
Bucci, former CIA operative in his book CIA: Cocaine In 
America, are just a few illegal drug operation3, by official 
members of the United States government. 
It is recommended that heavier restrictions be placed upon 
clandestine operations by intelligence agencies, and the 
establishment of more comprehensive prograrn management to 
eliminate the recurrence of any such operations. 
12~ichael Levine, The Big White Lie, The CIA and The 
Cocaine/Crack Epidemic, Thunders Mountain Press, 1993, 123. 
125 Ibid, 455. 
126Ibid, 104. 
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5. U.S. Judicial System Lacks Consistency 
Combining drug abuse treatment and education is the first 
step in reducing the U.S. demand for illegal drugs. When 
these measures do not reach those involved, theL steps must be 
taken to ensure that those who continue such abuse are 
punished swiftly and harshly. This, however, is not 
necessarily the case with the U.S. judicial system when 
examining antidrug efforts. To better reflect the reality of 
how burdening the drug problem has become, in 1990 the DEA 
reportedly made 21,799 drug related arrests. When including 
state, and local antidrug efforts, the total number of drug 
arrests peaked at almost 1.1 million. As discussed in 
previous chapters, the United States considers cocaine the 
largest drug problem in the nation. It however, is not the 
only drug problem facing the United States. Marijuana, 
heroin, and other assorted drugs have a significant impact 
too. To better illustrate, Figure 3-6 contrasts the number 
of DEA [Federal] drug arrests, by drug type. This does not 
represent only the arrests of major drug dealers, but everyday 
drug abusers as well. 
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Following drug arrests, the system passes to the 
prosecution phase, where a decision is made to either proceed 
with the case, or dismiss the charges. Inquiries into 
probable cause for investigation, arrest, determination of 
sufficient evidence, and a judgement on the credibility of 
the case will all be considered before a court justice assigns 
the case to a trial schedule. There are failures in every 
step of the process mentioned. Each judge interprets things 
individually, with no standardized system, thus causing 
inconsistency. When considering other factors such as 
corruption and overcrowded prisons, the system has has not 
made much progress in effectively reducing drug useage or 
trafficking. Figure 3-7 compares the different phases in d g 
c2ses, and reveals the national average of outcome in m t 
c-=>.ses. 127 
A clear trend can be seen again by the lack f 
a ::ountabili ty that is displayed by decreasing prosecut n 
r ::es. A good example of how frequently drug cases e 
c 3missed in the U.S. court system is the city of Manhatt 
N w York. For 1987, the city records reveal that jud s 
c smissed 32 percent of all drug trafficking cases, and 7 
p ~cent of drug possession cases. 128 
127Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 1989, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ-134730, May 
1992. 
128Prosecution of Felony Arrests, 1987, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ-124140, August 1990, 
20-23. 
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Using Manhattan, New York, as an example, in 1982 only 28 
percent of all drug arrests were ever indicted, and of those, 
only 24 percent were convicted. By 1987, those figures rose 
slightly, but stayed proportional, with drug indictments being 
54 percent, and convictions at 45 percent. 129 In both periods 
the convictions rarely were ever accompanied by substantial 
prison incarcerations. 
When reviewing the low conviction rates of drug charges, 
it is not difficult to understand why 57 percent of those 
rearrested [second arrest] , are done so on drug charges. 
Further, 64 percent of those rearrested [third arrest], Ere 
also due to drug related charges. When focusing on d: ~g 
arrests for cocaine nation-wide, in 1979 there were over 2,· 10 
arrests made. By 1990 that number escalated to over 13, 0 
a~ -ests. When the U.S. judicial system lacks the ability o 
e· 0rce personal accountability of the nation's ci tize' 
t se who continue to break the laws, will continue to do 
The drug strategy and the judicial system of the Uni d 
S tes maintain completely separate guidelines for juven e 
d: g cases. Concepts like "delinquency" in the place f 
gl lt, and "status offenses" [truancy, runaways] as excu. s 
f behavior, often replace accountability. The problem f 
ac consistency plagues the system. Most states institute t e 
ac lt age at 18, however, some are as low as 16, with othE s 
rE ching up to 21. 
To illustrate how the U.S. judicial system has mishandled 
juvenile drug cases, the following statistics reveal an 
inability to enforce its authority for drug offenses. The 
national average for 100 juvenile drug related cases resulted 
129Ibid, 10. 
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in 62 being petitioned for possible court action. Of those, 
14 placed, 27 were assigned probation, 17 were dismissed, and 
5 categorized as other [witness, plea bargain] . 130 
In conclusion, what can the judicial system do to improve 
the lack of enforcement and consistency in drug-related cases 
throughout the United States? Some observers recommend the 
death penalty for those involved in drug related cases with 
excessive violence. They argue that if we really desire to 
succeed in reducing drug abuse, we must consider that while 
many drug traffickers may not actually commit the violent acts 
themselves, they are indirectly responsible by making drugs 
available, with the causal effect of the violent act. Many 
foreign nations, including Malaysia and Singapore, do 
institute the death penalty for drug-related cases and their 
statistics for drug abuse and trafficking are substantially 
lower than those for the United States. The death penalty is 
opposed by some who consider it cruel, and unusual punishment. 
The most credible form of punishment for consistent drug 
traffickers is incarceration. This may create overcrowding in 
prisons. Other forms of punishment that can be implemented 
for drug related cases are strict probation programs and high 
fines. The system will first require reorganization, in order 
to produce the results required for success. The system must 
provide consistency in prosecuting drug offenses. 
1~Juvenile Court Drug and Alcohol Cases, 1985-1988. 
National Center for Juvenile Justice, September L990, 173. 
6. The Antidrug Regime Lacks Coordination 
Case: DEA & FBI Drug Investigations 
In response to an increasing drug abuse problem in the 
United States, the Drug Abuse and Treatment Act of 1972 was 
passed to establish a coordinating mechanism for the several 
agencies involved with antidrug efforts. Instead, what many 
critics argue is that the antidrug bureaucracy has become so 
big that it has reduced efficiency. In 1965, there were only 
two U.S. federal agencies conducting antidrug efforts and the 
total annual budget at that time was $10 mi1lion. Today, 
there are 54 agencies involved, and the annual budget exceeds 
$13 billion. A partial list includes the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency 
(NSA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), State 
Department, Pentagon, and all assets under the ~epartments of 
Treasury, Transportation, Defense . 131 If one limits the scope 
of the analysis of antidrug efforts to the DEA and FBI, one is 
struck by their lack of coordination. In attempting to 
consolidate antidrug efforts, the Nixon adminisLration created 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1S~3, within the 
Department of Justice. This reorganizing effort evolved from 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug:. (BNDD), and 
sections of U.S. Customs Service responsible for drug 
investigations. 132 The DEA was designated as the lead 
131Michael Levine, The Big White Lie, The CIA and the 
Cocaine/Crack Epidemic, Thunders Mountain Press, 1993, 462-463. 
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coordinating agency for U.S. antidrug efforts i~ much the same 
way that the CIA is supposed to coordinate all intellegence 
activities both domestically and abroad. By 1989 the DEA 
employed 2,527 special agents in its headquarters and domestic 
offices, and 252 special agents in 45 foreign countries. 133 
To enhance the investigative capabilities of the DEA, and 
improve coordination between DEA and FBI, the U.S. Attorney 
General, in 1982, authorized the use of the FBI's vastly 
superior resources by DEA when conducting drug investigations. 
At the same time, both agencies formally established written 
guidelines for assisting joint-agency coordination during 
investigations. These guidelines, however, are said to rarely 
be followed. Although the two agencies do conduct drug 
investigations together, statistics for 1987 to 1988, reveal 
that joint antidrug efforts only comprised of about 6 percent 
of DEA's total cases, and 16 percent of the FBI's total drug 
cases. 134 
The sharing of intelligence is considered a major problem 
area by the drug control strategy and re:quires serious 
improvement. When focusing on the DEA and FBI, both have 
completely independent intelligence networks. The DEA, when 
conducting drug investigations, primarily use its indigenous 
intelligence network, the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
Information System (NADDIS). Although the FBI can access this 
132Roy Godson and Earnest May, "Thinking About 
Reorganization," Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 
Washington, D.C., 1993. 
133Justice Department: Coordination Between DEA and FBI, 
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-90-59, March 1990, 2. 
134Ibid, 4. 
system, it prefers to use its own, the Organized Crime 
Information System (OCIS), and the Investigative Support 
Information System (ISIS). The use of two completely separate 
agency systems has created duplication o: efforts and 
inefficiency in federal antidrug investigations and 
intelligence collection. 135 
With the lack of coordination between the DEA and FBI being 
a consistent problem, the probability of merging the two 
agencies has been considered by past and current 
administrations: first in 1981; then in 1987; and more 
recently, in 1993, under the Clinton administration. The two 
agencies realistically have two totally different missions, 
and should be kept that way. The DEA, being focused on 
antidrug efforts, has the expertise, and unique capabilities 
for this "different" type of war. The FBI, tasked with the 
internal security of the nation, is much more technologically 
equipped, but lacks the knowledge and experience in drug 
operations. Both agencies utilize very different investigative 
techniques, and basically have established their own 
personalities. 
the already 
To merge the two would only further aggravate 
excessive turf-wars that exist between most 
federal, state, and local agencies involved in the drug war. 
In conclusion, the fact remains that coordination for 
antidrug efforts is lacking. When the Bush administration 
instituted the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
it did so hoping to provide a mechanism to coordinate 
antidrug efforts. Its cabinet-level status, however, allowed 
135National Drug Control Strategy 1994, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February 1994, 44. 
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priorities for the nation's drug control strategy. It does 
not, however, have any authority to direct antidrug agencies 
in their activity. The creation of the ONDCP consequently had 
very little impact on improving coordination of the antidrug 
regime. 136 In reality, there is no one agency in command of 
this international effort, nor does any one office hold enough 
authority to institute any real coordinated effort, and 
enforce it. 
If U.S. policy-makers are serious about coordinating 
antidrug efforts, they should indeed give one agency the power 
and authority to direct such efforts. The ONDCP is a move in 
the right direction, but decision-makers should also allow the 
ONDCP to have not only planning responsibilities, but 
directive authority as well. This would eliminate a large 
majority of turf-wars that severely limit success in counter-
drug operations. 
136Donald J. Mabry, The Latin American Narcotics Trade and 





Washington's drug policy has been one of the most 
expensive failures in American history. The streets are not 
safer, the flow of drugs has not stopped, and the spread of 
deadly diseases like AIDS from unsafe needle use has reached 
epidemic proportions. The declarations of war on drugs by the 
United States in 1986 now appears to have been only a symbolic 
measure. 135 The establishment of the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP) by the White House in 1989 has done 
little more than provide a weak figure-head to coordinate 
national antidrug efforts. The U.S. National Drug Control 
Strategy has provided a comprehensive framework for antidrug 
efforts, but has goals and objectives that are unreachable. 136 
Foreign efforts targeting drug organizations and 
traffickers overseas have had minimal impact against illegal 
drugs, but the effects on foreign relations with source and/or 
transshipment countries have been severely strained. The two 
broad factors discussed in this thesis that have undermined 
success in U.S. antidrug policy have been economics and 
politics. 
u
5National Security Directive 221, Declaration of Drug 
Trafficking as a National Security Threat, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, April 1986. 
u6Dione M. Canova, "The National Drug Control Strategy, A 
Synopsis," in James Inciardis, eds., Handbook·of Drug Control in 
the United States (Greenwood, 1990), 339. 
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Economically, the cocaine trade generates billions of 
dollars in profits every year, often overpowering efforts to 
conduct legitimate economic activities. The profitability of 
the illegal drug trade clearly has exceeded any effort made by 
U.S. policy. The $50 million to $60 million in restrictive 
U.S. antidrug assistance to Colombia, for example, represents 
a small sum when compared to the $7 billion of illegal drug 
revenues reinvested in the Colombian economy every year, 137 
and the $110 billion spent annually by U.S. consumers on 
illegal drugs. 138 
The financial impact of money laundering has been 
substantial on many of the economies of the world. Efforts to 
expand domestic and international programs combatting money 
laundering have failed because of lack of cooperation. The 
centralization of policy control by the United States must 
become more flexible to include foreign nations as decision-
makers, not only participants. 
United States foreign assistance programs appear to be 
motivated by a genuine concern for combatting drugs, but 
continue to fail because they are implemented as restrictive 
and coercive foreign policy tools. Future U.S. policy must 
allow for flexibility in funding usage. Policy-makers must 
improve the control of program management to better monitor 
policy achievements. 
137Rensselaer W. Lee, III, "Economic Aid Could Not Stop Drug 
Production," in David Bender and Bruno Leones, eds., The War on 
Drugs, Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhaven, 1990), 183. 
138G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International 
Political System, Westview, 1989, 274. 
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The corruption potential created by the illegal drug trade 
has compromised the professionalism, integrity, and 
effectiveness of those involved in antidrug efforts. It has 
been difficult to promote and strengthen democratic 
institutions throughout the world when money form illegal 
narcotics buys police, military personnel, politicians, and 
public officials. U.S. policy-makers must assess the level of 
drug-related corruption in formulating and implementing 
antidrug policies of the future. 
Politically, inter-agency coordination failure, non-
compliance with policy concepts, and unrealistic strategy 
objectives have all contributed to the continued failure of 
antidrug policy. The militarization of the war on drugs (use 
of the U.S. military) has been inappropriate, not cost 
effective, and detrimental to foreign relations. Even with 
the vast resources and capabilities the U.S. military 
possesses, the impact on the illegal drug trade has been 
negligible. The lack of a common military-to-civilian 
intelligence and communication network, the absence of any 
clear lines of authority in bilateral and joint operations, 
and the lack of a clear and concise set of guidelines continue 
to plague military operations. To continue with military 
participation in antidrug efforts, the Department of Defense 
must provide adequate law enforcement training to military 
personnel employed in this capacity. 
The fact that the drug cartels of Colombia are too 
powerful to overcome continues to plague U.S. antidrug 
efforts. Efforts to dismantle and destroy drug organizations 
seems to have had almost not impact on the continued flow of 
cocaine throughout the world. U.S. efforts in law enforcement 
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activity should continue, but the greater focus should be on 
demand-related programs. 
The vast array of agencies involved in antidrug efforts 
in the United States has not improved policy coordination, and 
has failed to implement a cohesive, legitimate antidrug 
regime. The are still too many agencies and no effective 
centralization of efforts or control. Decision-makers need to 
provide for joint and multilateral decision-making for all 
facets of antidrug policy. U.S. policy-makers must consider 
the full scope of the problem from both the U.S. and Latin 
American perspective, and properly balance the program 
objectives with available means. 
When antidrug strategy efforts fail and the laws of the 
United States are continually abused, the U.S. Judicial System 
must take steps to ensure swift and appropriate punishment. 
A clear trend toward minimal punishment in drug cases has 
resulted in a severe lack of accountability by those who 
continue to abuse drug laws. 
uphold justice within the 
Individuals who are sworn to 
judicial system must take 
responsibility for their positions and provide consistency in 
prosecuting drug-related cases. 
The focus of this thesis has been to examine the goals and 
objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy of the United 
States and the Andean Initiative, and then present several 
arguments for their failures. U.S. antidrug efforts will 
continue to fail in their present form if not restructured. 
Future antidrug policy will only succeed when efforts shift to 
target demand-related drug consumption by instituting 
effective drug education, treatment, and testing programs that 
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ensure compliance to federal laws. 139 This thesis concludes 
that any real solution to the drug problem lies not with 
supply interdiction, not with expanded foreign assistance, but 
with targeting user accountability in the United States. 
139Donald Mabry, The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. 




Andean Group Report. "Doubts over FARC's Peace Commitment," 
The Rand Corporation, Publication RA-89-04, 22 January 1989. 
Arnet, Peter and Barger, Brian, Kingdom of Cocaine, CNN, 
September 25, 1994. 
Atkins, G. Pope, Latin America In The International 
Political System, Westview Press, 1989. 
Bagley, Bruce Michael, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," 
Foreign Affairs, Fall 1988. 
Bagley, Bruce Michael and Tokatlian, Juan G., "Dope and 
Dogma: Explaining The Failure Of The U.S.-Latin Drug 
Policies," The United States and Latin America In The 1990s 
Beyond The Cold War (The University of North Carolina Press, 
1992). 
Bagley, Bruce Michael, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the War on 
Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure," Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs: Special Issue, Vol 30, 
Numbers 2 & 3, Summer/Fall 1988. 
Bender, David and Leone, Bruno, The War on Drugs: Opposing 
Viewpoints, Greenhaven Press, 1990. 
Bennett, William J., The De-Valuing of America: The Fight 
for Our Culture and Our Children, Summit Books, 1992. 
Berquist, Charles, Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary 
Crisis in Historical Perspective, Scholarly Resources Inc., 
1992. 
Bucci, Kenneth C., CIA: Cocaine In America, SPI Books, 1994. 
Castaneda, Jorge G., Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left 
After The Cold War, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. 
Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Intelligence Reports: 
Inside Secrets of The Smuggling Trade, Paladin Press, 1988. 
Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Narcotics Investigators 
Manual, Paladin Press, 1988. 
91 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean: 1990, 
United Nations, Santiago, Chile, 1992. 
Falco, Mathea, The Making of Drug-Free America: Programs 
That Work, Times Books, 1992. 
Fauriol, Georges, Security in the Americas, National Defense 
University Press, 1989. 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin 
America. FBIS-LAT-XX-XXX Washington D.C., 1989 to 1994. 
Freemantle, Barry, The Fix: Inside the World Drug Trade, Tom 
Doherty Associates, Inc., 1986. 
Gross, Hawkeye K., Drug Smuggling: The Forbidden Book, 
Paladin Press, 1992. 
Hanratty, Dennis M., Colombia: A Country Study, Library of 
Congress Cataloging-In-Publication Data, 1990. 
Higley, John and Gunther, Richard, Elites and Democratic 
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Inciardi, James A., The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, 
Crime, and Public Policy, Mayfield Publishing Company, 1986. 
Inciardi, James A., Handbook of Drug Control in the United 
States, Greenwood Press, 1990. 
Johanson, Chris-Ellyn, The Encyclopedia of Psychoactive 
Drugs: Cocaine, A New Epidemic. Chelsea House Publishers, 
1986. 
Kennedy, Michael, A Simple Economic Model of Cocaine 
Production, Rand/RP-191, 1991. 
Kirsch, M., Designer Drugs: Crack, Dust, Ecstasy, MPTP, 
Crystal, China White, Compcare Publications, 1986. 
Kline, Harvey F., Colombia: Portrait of Unity and Diversity, 
Western Press, 1983. 
Lama, G., "Latin Allies Prefer U.S. Money to Military in 
Drug Fight," Chicago Tribune, February 13, 1990. 
92 
Lee, Rensselaer W., The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and 
Political Power, Transaction Publishers, 1989. 
Levine, Michael, Deep Cover, Thunders Mountain Press, 1992. 
Levine, Michael, The Big White Lie: The CIA and The 
Cocaine/Crack Epidemic, Thunders Mountain Press, 1993. 
MacDonald, Scott B., Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin 
American Drug Trade, Praeger Publishers, 1988. 
MacDonald, Scott B., Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine 
and Power in the Andean States and Panama, Praeger 
Publishers, 1989. 
Mabry, Donald J., The Latin American Narcotics Trade and 
U.S. National Security, Greenwood Press, 1989. 
Malloy, J., Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record. 
Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1990. 
Mermelstein, Max., Inside The Cocaine Cartel, SPI Books, 
1990, 1994. 
Merrill, John P., Drugs and Democracy: Reconciling 
Counternarcotics and Counter-Insurgency Objectives, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1993. 
Morales, Edmundo, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru, 
University of Arizona Press, 1989. 
"Miami's Great American Bank of Dade County used by 
South American Narcotics Traffickers to Launder Drug 
Profit Money," Miami Herald, 14 December 1989. 
"Drug Traffickers Corrupt, Infiltrate Colombian Forces," 
Miami Herald, 30 September 1989. 
National Drug Control Strategy 1989, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the 
President, Washington, D.C., September 5, 1989. 
National Drug Control Strategy 1990, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the 
President, Washington, D.C., January 25, 1990. 
93 
National Drug Control Strategy 1991, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the 
President, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1991. 
National Drug Control Strategy 1992: A Nation Responds 
to Drug Use, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C., 
January, 1992. 
National Drug Control Strategy 1994: Reclaiming Our 
Communities From Drugs and Violence, the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
Washington, D.C., February, 1994. 
"Colombian Police and Soldiers are Reportedly Tipping Off 
Drug Figures," New York Times, 4 September 1989. 
Pastor, Robert A., Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Princeton University Press, 
1992. 
Porter, Bruce, Blow, Harper Paperbacks, 1993. 
Reed, Terry and Cummings, John, Compromised: Clinton, Bush 
and the CIA, How the Presidency was Co-opted by the CIA, 
SPI, 1994. 
Sowell, Thomas, Inside American Education: The Decline, The 
Deception, The Dogmas, The Free Press, 1993. 
Street Level Narcotics Enforcement, Paladin Press, 1992. 
Terrorist Group Profiles, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1988. 
The World Factbook 1992, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1992. 
Trager, Oliver, Drugs in America: Crisis or Hysteria?, Facts 
of File Publications, 1986. 
U.S. Department of Education, What Works: Schools Without 
Drugs, 1986. 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug War: Observations 
on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia, GAO/NSAID 91-296, 
September 1991. 
94 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Andean Initiative, 
Congressional Hearing, June 6 & 20, 1990. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Andean Drug Strategy, 
Congressional Hearing, February 26, 1992. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Andean Drug Initiative, 
Congressional Hearing, February 20, 1992. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics: Drugs Crime, and the Justice System, 1992. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report: Bureau of International Narcotics 
Matters, U.S. Department of State, March, 1989. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, National Security Directive 
221: Declaration of Drug Trafficking as a National Security 
Threat, April 1986. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Review of the National Drug 
Control Strategy 1990, Congressional Hearing, September 7 & 
12, 1989. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Review of the National Drug 
Control Strategy 1991, Congressional Hearing, February 6, 
1991. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Review of the National Drug 
Control Strategy 1992, Congressional Hearing, February 4, 
1992. 
Wilkie, James, Statisical Abstract of Latin America, 1992. 
Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do 
and Why They Do It, Basics Books, 1989. 
Witkin, G., How Politics Ruined Drug War Planning, U.S. News 
and World Report, February 22, 1993. 
95 
96 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ................ 2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145 
2. Library, Code 52 .................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau ............................... l 
National Security Affairs (NS/BN) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
4. Dr. Scott D. Tollefson .............................. l 
National Security Affairs (NS/TO) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5. LT Jonathon Scott Davis, USN ........................ 2 
Special Projects Squadron Unit One 
Box 55 
NAS Brunswick, ME 04011-5000 
- 97 
